Abstract
Following Rescher we will develop a theory of attributes on the assumption that “properties must admit of exemplification, but they need not be exemplified.”1We will thus make use of the undefined expression,“x. exemplifiesy”. as well as thede re. modal concept expressed by“x. is necessarily such that it isF”. We presuppose the theory of states of affairs. The latter theory makes use of the ontological concept ofobtaining., as well as the intentional concepts ofacceptance andentertainment.2 The theory of states of affairs also requires an apparatus for temporal reference; in what follows I will make use of tense.
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Notes
Nicholas Rescher,A Theory of Possibility. ( Oxford and Pittsburgh: Blackwells and the University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975 ), p. 7.
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Chisholm, R.M. (1979). Toward a Theory of Attributes. In: Sosa, E. (eds) The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9407-2_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9407-2_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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