What the Mind’s Eye Tells the Mind’s Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery

Abstract

This paper presents a critique of contemporary research which uses the notion of a mental image as a theoretical construct to describe one form of memory representation. It is argued that an adequate characterization of ‘what we know’ requires that we posit abstract mental structures to which we do not have conscious access and which are essentially conceptual and propositional, rather than sensory or pictorial, in nature. Such representations are more accurately referred to as symbolic descriptions than as images in the usual sense. Implications of using an imagery vocabulary are examined, and it is argued that the picture metaphor underlying recent theoretical discussions is seriously misleading — especially as it suggests that the image is an entity to be perceived. The relative merits of several alternative modes of representation (propositions, data structures, and procedures) are discussed. The final section is a more speculative discussion of the nature of the representation which may be involved when people ‘use’ visual images.

Several of the arguments appearing in this paper were first developed in the course of discussions held with Marvin Minsky and Michael Arbib. Also, the careful critical reading given an earlier version of this paper by Allan Paivio has hopefully led to a more careful and balanced presentation. I am grateful to these people for their help but am not so optimistic as to expect that they will agree with all the arguments appearing in the final draft.