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Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game

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Game Theory as a Theory of a Conflict Resolution

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLU,volume 2))

Abstract

In this paper we make use of a theory of social behavior (Burns and Meeker, 1973; 1972) to analyze structurally the prisoners’ dilemma game (Rapoport, 1960; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965) and to indicate resolutions of the dilemma under specified conditions. The theory is characterized by (i) descriptive models rather than normative or prescriptive models of social behavior; (ii) emphasis on multi-dimensional processes and on structural relationships rather than uni-dimensional quantities (such as ‘utility’); and (iii) a view of interaction processes and context as a system (Buckley, 1967) and, in particular, the thesis that evaluation, decision, and interaction processes cannot be understood apart from the social context in which they occur (Burns, 1973).

We are grateful to Hayward Alker, Jr., Walter Buckley, and Russell Hardin for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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© 1974 D. Rediel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Burns, T., Meeker, L.D. (1974). Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game. In: Rapoport, A. (eds) Game Theory as a Theory of a Conflict Resolution. Theory and Decision Library, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0489-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2161-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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