Patterns of Use of Science in Ethics

Abstract

It is commonly recognised that the question of the relation of science to ethics has been a troubled one, especially in the 20th century. There is an interesting history to the question. Scientists have occasionally attempted to legislate for ethics. They thought to determine morality from their biological results — for example, their conclusions about human evolution. Or else, they offered lists of instincts or needs out of which they expected a conception of the good to be constructed. They framed concepts of mental health to serve as a basis for morals, or attempted to apply to moral inquiry the latest model from the latest science. Philosophers reacted with emphasis, often with impatience. They attempted to establish and maintain a concept of moral autonomy which would free them from an incipiently authoritarian science as it had freed them from an authoritarian religion. Sometimes they fell instead into the clutches of an authoritarian linguistics, and they confused autonomy with isolation. Many philosophers felt that the whole question had really been settled when G. E. Moore worked out the idea of the naturalistic fallacy in his Principia Ethica at the beginning of the century, and separated the moral sphere from the natural sphere; in one form or another, it has won assent in the analytic world. In more popular vein, and among perhaps most scientists, it has seemed enough to say ‘Science can give us only means, not ends.’

In revising this paper, the writer is generally indebted for critical suggestions to Professors John Ladd and Ruth Putnam. The latter’s comments on the treatment of G.E. Moore were especially helpful.