Abstract
The Received View of the philosophy of science — in a way still dominating many physical and social sciences, yet already vigorously challenged — is not identical with positivism but emerged in its wake. This view is strongly biased toward the construction of scientific theories by means of axiomatic calculi to which partial observational interpretations are given. As F. Suppe (1974, p. 4) points out: “the positiviste analysis of scientific knowledge erected upon the Received View has been rejected..., but none of the alternative analyses of scientific knowledge which have been suggested enjoy widespread acceptance.”
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Stegmüller (1975b, pp. 2–3).
As hinted at previously (see Section 2.1) we consider introspection as a cognitive experience (though a subjective one) and hence an empirical event — after all the word “empirical” stems ethymologically from the word “experience”. This is one of our justifications for distinguishing between uncritical and critical empiricism. The latter admits subjective experiences such as value judgements, and criticizes or rejects some of the principles of the Received View as discussed here.
Cf. Hempeland Oppenheim, 1948, pp. 137–139.
See Hempel, 1966, p. 67.
G. H. von Wright (1971) developed a hermeneutic theory of teleological explanations (instead of causal explanations, as demonstrated above) for human actions. See also Stegmüller (1975a, pp. 103–147).
Salmon, (1975, p. 13).
Idem., p. 18.
Idem., p. 18.
From Suppe (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories, 1974, pp. 50–51.
This expression should not be confused with “normative methodology” (i.e. prescribing methodological rules for testing hypotheses etc.) because Kuhn, Feyerabend and others explicitly reject such methodology.
The following passage gives proof of the normative remnant present in Stegmiiller’s theory: In these branches we have located a juncture where value judgements are unavoidable in deciding which way to proceed. Should someone regard this as subjectivism, the only correct reply is that this is a species of subjectivism which we simply must swallow. Stegmüller (1975b, p. 15).
The term “retroductive inference” is taken from Peirce who interprets Aristotle’s third inference not as “practical” inference (as we did in Section 4.4 and as it is usually done) but as retroduction (also reduction or abduction). Peirce seems to have referred to those inferences which involve a kind of pattern recognition. Whether the set of retroductive inferences is or is not a sub-set of the set at all inductive inferences in the broad sense is for us an open question.
Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, 1958, pp. 29–30.
“Thus on the Popperian model of growth, the outcome of evaluation of competing theories depends ultimately on the acceptance or rejection of ‘basic statements’. Such a decision is a matter of convention. It can never be conclusively justified and is always open to revision. In the light of this epistemological vertigo, Feyerabend sees only one possible consequence — sceptical fallibilism.” McEvoy (1975, p. 63).
To avoid confusion, some variance in terminology must be pointed out: Sneed (1971) and Stegmüller (1975b) speak of possible models and possible partial models, while Stegmüller (1973a) and Kuhn (1975) use the expressions potential models and partial potential models respectively.
Cf. Lakatos (1970 and 1972).
Where theoretical terms are dispensable for the essential formulation of the theory, one speaks of Ramsey-eliminability. In these cases the merit of theoretical terms lies mainly in simplifying a theory and in making it more precise as well as economical. Where Ramsey-eliminability is not feasible there… one speaks of a second type of merit of theoretical terms: the T-theoretical terms enable prediction as well as explanation and supply methods of hypothesis testing that were not possible without them (Stegmüller, 1973a, p.94, translated).
For details and thorough explanations see Stegmüller (1973a, pp. 75–106).
Laws hold in some or all applications.
The areas of disagreement between Thomas Kuhn, on one side, and the Sneed— Stegmüller formalism, on the other side, concerns several technical details. For example, in Kuhn’s view it is not necessarily the theory, but may well be the application of this theory, which determines whether a specific concept or function is theoretical or not. He also points out that in order to determine what belongs to a theory core and what to an expanded core will require much more specification than Sneed and Stegmüller have so far supplied. Kuhn, therefore, concludes “that before the Sneed formalism can be used effectively to identify and, analyse episodes in which theory-change occurs by replacement, rather than simply by growth, some other technique must be found to distinguish, the elements in a core from those in its expansion. What is needed, I take it, is an explicit and general articulation, within the formalism, of some widely shared intuitions, two of which were expressed above. Why is Newton’s second law clearly constitutive of mechanics, his law of gravitation not? (Footnote omitted.) What underlies our conviction that relativistic mechanics differs conceptually from Newtonian in a way that, say, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics do not?” (Kuhn, 1975, pp. 13–14). Furthermore, Kuhn considers Stegmüller’s use of the reduction relation (for reducing one theory core etc. to another) as dangerously circular. Stegmüller, on the other hand, takes issue with Kuhn’s notion of progress and writes: “It certainly is unsatisfactory, to introduce the concept of scientific progress in such a way that one slips into sociology, declaring always those researchers as the more progressive ones, who in the end proved themselves successful in fighting out a ‘paradigm conflict’. This would virtually mean making no essential distinction between political and scientific revolution. In some of his formulations Kuhn does create the impression of actually assuming this point of view. Thus the polemic directed against him on this score is comprehensible and, in as far as it rests on a valid interpretation, is fully justified.” Translated from Stegmüller (1975a, p.525). Stegmüller calls Kuhn’s notions of progress “ideologically infected” and suggests to solve the problem of scientific progress in the following way: “Elimination of a theory under ‘scientific progress’ is present whenever the old theory is structurally reducible to the new theory. Elimination of a theory without progress, however, is present when such a reduction is not possible” Translated from Stegmüller (1975a, p. 529).
Reprinted from Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy, 1972.
See for example the “devastating” criticism of General Systems Theory by Buck, ‘On the Logic of General Behaviour Systems Theory’, 1956; the more moderate criticism by Lektorsky and Sadovosky, ‘On Principles of System Research’, 1961; and the somewhat misdirected wholesale rejection of systems theory by Phillips, ‘Systems Theory — A Discredited Philosophy’, 1969.
Ashby, ‘General Systems Theory as a New Discipline’, 1958, p. 2. The above quote from Ashby is acknowledged by von Bertalanffy (1962, p. 4).
L. von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, 1968, p. 37.
Cf. L. von Bertalanffy, ‘An Outline of General System Theory’, 1950.
Young, ‘A Survey of General Systems Theory’, 1965, offers an interesting review of scholars concerned with systems and analyzes the conformity and diversity of their concepts.
Cf. Nagel, Teleologieal Explanations and Teleological Systems’, 1953, reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Brody, pp. 106–120.
During the last 15 years the present author has been instrumental in developing a general theory of accounting or management information systems. Even this comparatively “low” degree of abstraction proved to be such a formidable task that the ultimate solution is still to be sought. See Mattessich, Towards a General and Axiomatic Foundation of Accountancy’, Nagel, Accounting and Analytical Methods, 1964a
Nagel, Die Wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen des Rechungswesens — Eine analytische und erkenntniskritische Darstellung doppischer Informationssysteme fuer Betriebs- und Volkswirtschaft, 1970
Nagel, ‘Methodological Preconditions and Problems of a General Theory of Accounting’, 1972.
Ackoff, ‘General Systems Theory and Systems Research Contrasting Conceptions of Systems Science’, 1963, p. 117.
Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, 1969. Further evidence of this more sceptical approach can be found in Simon and Newell, ‘Models: Their Uses and Limitations’, 1956, while other administrative scientists embrace General Systems Theory less critically, e.g. Johnson, Kast and Rosenzweig, ‘Systems Theory and Management’, 1964.
Reprinted from Melcher, ‘Theory and Application of Systems Theory: Its Promises, Problems, and Realizations’, 1975, p. 1.
“The research that has been done over the past five years on the design of computer time-sharing systems is a good example of the study of computer behavior as an empirical phenomenon… To understand them, systems had to be constructed, and their behavior observed.” (pp. 20–21). In this essay I should like to report on some things we have been learning about particular kinds of complex systems encountered in the behavioral sciences.” (p. 85), Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial.
“It seems to me that Systems Research is on sounder grounds than General Systems Theory because it takes systems as it finds them: holistically, in all their multidisciplinary glory. It unifies the disciplines in the conduct of research and hence it produces facts, laws, and theories, which are multidisciplinary in character. The theories produced by Operations Research, for example, do more than summarize a set of available theories in a cross-disciplinary language because these theories come out of the study of systems, rather than the study of theories of systems.” Ackoff, ‘General Systems Theory and Systems Research — Contrasting Conceptions of Systems Science’, 1963, p. 119.
See Wholes and Parts (1962/1965).
“Well, then, what is the systems approach? On the one hand, we must recognize it to be the most critical problem we face today, the understanding of the systems in which we live. On the other hand, however, we must admit that the problem — the appropriate approach to systems — is not solved, but this is a very mild way of putting the matter. This is not an unsolved problem in the sense in which certain famous mathematical problems are unsolved. It’s not as though we can expect that next year or a decade from now someone will find the correct systems approach and all deception will disappear. This, in my opinion, is not in the nature of systems. What is in the nature of systems is a continuing perception and deception, a continuing re-viewing of the world, of the whole system, and of its components.” Churchman, The Systems Approach, 1968, p. 230.
The first volume of Tektologia’s German translation, Allgemeine Organisationslehre (1926), was reviewed by J. Pregel under the title ‘Um die allgemeine Organisationslehre’ in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 25, July 1972, p. 18 ff.
Gorelik, ‘Re-emergence of Bogdanov’s Tektology in Soviet Studies of Organization’, 1973.
Gorelik,, ‘Principal Ideas of Bogdanov’s “Tektology”: the Universal Science of Organization’, 1975.
Its main feature is “the establishment of laws of biological systems” in contrast to mechanism which “neither saw or wished to see this fundamental characteristic of life”, and vitalism which “put a philosophical construction in the place of natural scientific investigation”. Bertalanffy (1933/1962, p. 188).
Quoted from Gorelik (1975, p. 3).
Other major representatives of GST, beside L. von Bertalanffy, and Ashby (see e.g. his ‘General Systems Theory as a New Discipline’, 1958), Boulding (e.g. ‘General Systems Theory — The Skeleton of Science’, 1956), and Rapoport (e.g. ‘Remarks on General Systems Theory’, 1963); Laszlo (e.g. Introduction to Systems Philosophy, 1972).
Research and publications of RAND-Corporation, Santa Monica were of decisive influence in this area. Other relevant publications for instance are: David O. Ellis and Fred J. Ludwig, Systems Philosophy, 1962
Eckman (ed.), Systems: Research and Design 1961
Hall and Fagen, A Methodology for Systems Engineering, 1962
Hare, Systems Analysis: A Diagnostic Approach, 1967
Mesarovic, The Control of Multivariable Systems, 1960
Iberall, Toward a General Science of Viable Systems, 1972.
E.g.: Johnson, Kast and Rosenzweig, The Theory and Management of Systems, 1963; Buckley (e.g. Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, 1967
Seiler, Systems Analysis in Organizational Behavior, 1967
Kuhn’s The Logic of Social Systems, 1974
Among the many anthologies in this field are some especially well known: Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, 1968
Emery (ed.), Systems Thinking, 1969
Laszlo (ed.), The Relevance of General Systems Theory, 1972b
Laszlo, (ed.), The World System, 1973
Baker (ed.), Organizational Systems, 1973
Optner (ed.), Systems Analysis, 1973.
In Management Science, 1971.
1962 and Ackoff and Emery, On Purposeful Systems, 1972.
Churchman, The Systems Approach, 1968b, p. 20.
Churchman, Challenge to Reason, 1968a, p. 5.
Emery, Organizational Planning and Control Systems, 1969, hints at the difficulties here involved:
With three identical elementary tasks there are two different structures, and with four such tasks there are five alternatives. The number grows to a total of 2,312 alternative structures in the case of ten elementary tasks… In an actual system most of the elementary tasks are, of course, distinct rather than identical. This enormously expands the number of alternatives… With ten such tasks there are over 28 million alternatives…
We need not be intimidated by this numbers game. A count of the alternative structures perhaps provides an interesting and impressive index of the impossible complexity of the systems problem facing a designer but on finding an “optimal” structure. Paradoxically, the very vastness of the numbers simplifies the task of choosing the structure in practice, (pp. 7–8).
Cf. Mattessich, ‘Philosophie der Unternehmensforschung’, 1962.
Challenge to Reason, 1968a, pp. 11–12. Passages with a similar ring are found in other works of Churchman: cf. Prediction and Optimal Decision, 1961 and The Systems Approach, 1968b.
Churchman, The Systems Approach, 1968b, pp. 10–11.
Cf. The Sciences of the Artificial, p. 52. The above remark reveals the semantical trap into which Simon might step if he identified “adaptation” of a system as an artificial process; then the natural sciences, too, especially biology, become sciences of the artificial.
Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, 1969, pp. 4 and 5.
The Sciences of the Artificial, p. 11,13.
“A black box theory treats its object or subject matter as if it were a system devoid of internal structure; it focuses on the system’s behavior and handles the system as a single unit.” Bunge, Scientific Research, Vol. 1, p. 509.
The Sciences of the Artificial, p. 17.
Further details on this insight were elaborated previously by Simon (1962).
Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, 1969, p. 22.
Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, 1969, pp. 56–58.
In this connection the question may arise why Simon, in spite of his concern for a science of designing goal-oriented entities, denies the normative character of such a science (cf. our Section 2.5).
See The Sciences of the Artificial, pp. 79–80.
“It is fitting to begin with a prediction made by Simon in 1957 as his General Problem Solver seemed to be opening up the area of artificial intelligence… Simon then predicts among other things,
(1) That within ten years a digital computer will be the world’s chess champion, unless the rules bar it from competition.
(2) That within ten years a digital computer will discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem.
(3) That within ten years most theories in psychology will take the form of computer programs, or the qualitative statements about the characteristics of computer programs.” Simon and Newell (1958), p. 6.
“Unfortunately, the tenth anniversary of this historic talk went unnoticed, and workers in artificial intelligence did not, at any of their many national or international meetings, take time out from their propess reports to confront these predictions with the actual achievements. Now fourteen years have passed, and we are being warned that it may soon be difficult to control our robots. It is certainly high time to measure this original prophecy against reality.” Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do, 1972, pp. xxix-xxx.
The expression “arithmomorphic” was coined by Georgescu-Roegen to designate symbols and concepts which “are as directly distinct as a single number in relation to the infinity of all other” (1971, p. 14).
From Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, 1971, pp. 46–47.
From Durant, The Story of Philosophy, 1926. Quoted from the Cardinal Edition, 1952, p. 295.
Layzer (1975) presents a cosmological theory which describes the various stages of cosmic evolution as follows:
In a model devised by the author (Layzer) and his students the initial state of the universe is assumed to be devoid of all information and structure. In the period immediately following the “big bang” (a) the universe is in the thermodynamic equilibrium, maintained by the rapid interaction of particles of radiation. After expanding for about 15 minutes, the universe crystallizes, or freezes, into an alloy of metallic hydrogen and helium (b). Because of the continuing cosmic expansion this solid universe shatters into fragments of approximately planetary mass (c), which forms a “gas” in the sense that they interact frequently and randomly much like the molecules of an ordinary gas. In the planetary gas density fluctuations eventually develop (d) as poups of several fragments adhere; the fluctuations grow at larger and larger scales as groups of fragments themselves aggregate (e). Eventually a hierarchy of structures is formed, corresponding to stars, galaxies and clusters of galaxies seen today (f). Layzer (1975, p. 66). The letters (a) to (f) refer to illustrations (p. 67) here not reproduced.
An excellent, fairly up-to-date survey of cosmological evolution, as based on scientific evidence and hypotheses, is offered by Stegmüller (1975a, pp. 255–375).
As regards the atomic nucleous and its hypothesized components (quarks, gluons etc.), too little is known today to present any illustrations, but there is no counter-evidence to doubt the validity of the periodicity principle in this sub-nuclear realm.
The steel spirals, in spring mattresses, are perhaps an even better known example of this very same periodicity principle. If one compares the strength and resilience of a spiral spring with that of a flat spring, one gets a hint of the workings of this principle.
Our principle of concrescence must not be confused with Whitehead’s “principle of concretion”, which asserts the “initial aim” or final cause of each concrescence, and thus is identified by him with God. Cf. Whitehead (1929, p. 345). But in many respects Whitehead’s “philosophy of organism” (1929, pp. 342–343), is closely related to the systems approach.
Thomas, The Lives of a Cell, 1974, p. 4.
Ibid., p. 12.
For Whitehead feeling is “the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question.” Process and Reality, 1929, p. 55.
Bronowski, The Ascent of Man, 1973, p. 348.
A most exciting and rigorous, statistical analysis of the early stages of biological evolution (i.e. from dead to living “matter”) has been offered by the German Nobel-laureate Eigen (1971), while a somewhat competing view was presented by Hans Kuhn (1973). For a more popular, but excellent discussion of both views, as well as of Monod’s less profound best seller (1970), see Stegmüller (1975a, pp. 376–482). A more detailed popular presentation of Eigen’s approach is presented by Eigen and Winkler (1975).
For a related but somewhat different view see Piaget (1971), pp. 268–305.
Many adherents of GST, like Wilson, seem to share Lewis’ (1944) view that “the analytical process of scientific epistemology… is by its nature ‘a basilisk which kills what it sees and only sees by killing’.” (Wilson, 1973, p. 123.)
E.g. See Walters and Clark (1975) and Linstone and Turoff (1975).
E.g. Forrester (1961), Mattessich (1961 and 1964b), Balderston and Hoggat (1962). For a comprehensive survey see Naylor (1971).
A useful discussion about value judgements in science, philosophy and technology and a classification of different types of value judgements is found by Chmielewicz (1970).
The so-called “Erlangen-model” — e.g. see Lorenzen (1974), Lorenzen and Schwemmer (1975), Schwemmer (1976), Steinmann et al. (1976) — may be regarded as a reaction to critical rationalism, and grows out of Schwemmer’s constructivism which manifests a broad influence by such authors as Brower, Gentzen, Kant, Poincaré, Dilthey as well as the Hegelian—Marxian dialectic. It is thus not unrelated to the Frankfurt school of Habermas and his precursors. The Erlangen-model resembles in some features the Delphi-method as developed by Helmer (1967) and others (see Linstone and Turoff 1975). Similar to the latter, it presupposes a community of experts or “reasonable” people, tends towards a community consensus (transsubjectivity and reasonable consent) and emphasises practice-oriented thinking (the rules of open connections and normative genesis), the basis of which are the cultural and, above all, natural needs of people.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1978 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mattessich, R. (1978). Philosophy of Science and the Systems Approach. In: Instrumental Reasoning and Systems Methodology. Theory and Decision Library, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9431-3_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9431-3_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1081-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-9431-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive