Abstract
The primary criterion of adequacy of a probabilistic causal analysis is that the causal variable should render the simultaneous phenomenological data conditionally independent. The intuition back of this idea is that the common cause of the phenomena should factor out the observed correlations. So we label the principle the common cause criterion. If we find that the barometric pressure and temperature are both dropping at the same time, we do not think of one as the cause of the other but look for a common dynamical cause within the physical theory of meteorology. If we find fever and headaches positively correlated, we look for a common disease as the source and do not consider one the cause of the other. But we do not want to suggest that satisfaction of this criterion is the end of the search for causes or probabilistic explanations. It does represent a significant and important milestone in any particular investigation.
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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Suppes, P. (1993). When are Probabilistic Explanations Possible?. In: Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays. Synthese Library, vol 226. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2300-8_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2300-8_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4257-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2300-8
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