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The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference

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Paradigms for Language Theory and Other Essays

Part of the book series: Jaakko Hintikka Selected Papers ((HISP,volume 4))

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Abstract

The so-called New Theory of Reference (Marcus. Kripke etc.) is inspired by the insight that in modal and intensional contexts quantifiers presuppose nondescriptive unanalyzable identity criteria which do not reduce to any descriptive conditions. From this valid insight the New Theorists fallaciously move to the idea that free singular terms can exhibit a built-in direct reference and that there is even a special class of singular terms (proper names) necessarily exhibiting direct reference. This fallacious move has been encouraged by a mistaken belief in the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers. by the myth of the de re reference, and a mistaken assimilation of “direct reference” to ostensive (perspectival) identification. The de ditto vs. de re contrast does not involve direct reference, being merely a matter of rule-ordering (“scope”).

The New Theorists’ thesis of the necessity of identities of directly referred-to individuals is a consequence of an unmotivated and arbitrary restriction they tacitly impose on the identification of individuals.

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Sandu, G. (1998). The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference. In: Paradigms for Language Theory and Other Essays. Jaakko Hintikka Selected Papers, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2531-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2531-6_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

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