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An Economic Analysis of Privacy Seals

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Privacy and Data Protection Seals

Part of the book series: Information Technology and Law Series ((ITLS,volume 28))

Abstract

This chapter proposes an economic analysis of privacy seals and trustmarks and their role in solving problems of information asymmetries that can reduce market participation. The chapter focuses on three aspects. First, the chapter analyses the demand for privacy protection and the supply of data protection and security. Second, the chapter provides an economic analysis of privacy seals. Finally, it discusses the economic impacts of privacy seals and trustmarks.

Patrick Waelbroeck, Professor of Industrial Economics and Econometrics, Telecom Paristech. Email: patrick.waelbroeck@telecom-paristech.fr

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the ACSE-CDC Baromètre de la confiance 2015: http://www.acsel.asso.fr/resultats-du-barometre-2015-acsel-cdc-de-la-confiance-des-francais-dans-le-numerique/. Accessed 16 January 2018.

  2. 2.

    See Pariser 2011.

  3. 3.

    See Anderson and Gabszewicz 2006.

  4. 4.

    See http://uk.businessinsider.com/theres-some-new-data-out-on-the-huge-ad-blocking-trend-and-its-a-grim-read-for-online-publishers-2015-9. Accessed 1 September 2016.

  5. 5.

    A non-rival good is a good whose consumption by one consumer does not prevent simultaneous consumption by other consumers. A good or service is non-excludable if non-paying consumers cannot be prevented from consuming it.

  6. 6.

    Most Internet platforms are multi-sided with indirect positive externalities. For instance, Google and Facebook match advertisers and Internet users. The advertisers value more platforms where there are many Internet users (indirect positive externalities between the two sides of the platform). A platform that gains a slight initial advantage over its competitors benefits from a vicious circle that can lead to a dominant position.

  7. 7.

    Mantelero 2013.

  8. 8.

    For an example, see Kelley et al. 2009.

  9. 9.

    See the FTC press release available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-through-its. Accessed 5 September 2016.

  10. 10.

    See Fan et al. 2016 for a recent contribution.

  11. 11.

    For a discussion, see Rodrigues et al. 2013.

  12. 12.

    Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy 2002.

  13. 13.

    Connolly 2008.

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Waelbroeck, P. (2018). An Economic Analysis of Privacy Seals. In: Rodrigues, R., Papakonstantinou, V. (eds) Privacy and Data Protection Seals. Information Technology and Law Series, vol 28. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-228-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-228-6_8

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