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Aggression and Atrocity—The Interstate Element, Politics, and Individual Responsibility

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Rethinking the Crime of Aggression
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Abstract

At the heart of the crime of aggression is one State’s breach of its public international law duties to another. Indeed, the criminal responsibility of an individual leader depends on this interstate violation. For many, this makes aggression uniquely challenging to the structure of international criminal law. The putative difficulties are twofold. First, it is not clear in what sense an individual can be responsible for an interstate wrong. Second, the competence of criminal courts to adjudicate a dispute between States is at the very least open to question. These problems are only exacerbated by what some have characterized as fatal ambiguities in the definition of the crime. Aggression is, on this common view, the odd crime out in international law. Such critiques misunderstand the crime and mischaracterize those with which it is contrasted. Aggression does entail an interstate violation and there are ambiguities at its margins, but so do a number of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Moreover, contrary to a common view, the interstate element of aggression does not reflect a deeper normative divergence from such crimes. The large-scale violation of fundamental human rights is as normatively central to the criminality of aggressive war as it is to that of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. In short, the project of criminalizing aggression is the project of international criminal justice, and the problems of the crime of aggression are the problems of international criminal justice. Efforts to isolate aggression underpin both an excessive dismissiveness to the jus ad bellum crime, and a complacency regarding the posture of international criminal law more broadly.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Article 8bis (2) Rome Statute.

  2. 2.

    Article 8bis (2) Rome Statute; Article 2 (4) UN Charter.

  3. 3.

    Article 16 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Yb ILC Vol. II, Part Two, commentary para 4.

  4. 4.

    Akande 2011, p. 17. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force unless the State is acting in individual or collective self-defense or pursuant to Security Council authorization, Articles 2 (4), 39, 42, 51, 53 UN Charter. On the zero-sum structure of self-defense, see Military Tribunal XI, Judgment of 11 April 1949 (United States v. von Weizsäcker et al.), 14 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1949), p. 329. Self-defense rights do not obtain in response to Security Council authorized actions. International Law Association Use of Force Committee 2014, Sect. B.2; cf. also infra note 108.

  5. 5.

    Stahn 2010, p. 877; Iverson 2014, p. 96; Creegan 2012; Gomaa 2003.

  6. 6.

    A. Neier et al., ‘Regarding the Crime of Aggression’, Letter to Foreign Ministers, 10 May 2010, available at www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/icc-aggression-letter-20100511.pdf (accessed 1 March 2021); Luban 1994, pp. 335–341; Koh and Buchwald 2015, p. 292; Creegan 2012; S. Sewall, ‘The ICC Crime of Aggression and the Changing International Security Landscape, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law’, 9 April 2015, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/remarks/240579.htm (accessed 1 March 2021).

  7. 7.

    As the International Military Tribunal put it, ‘Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself.’ IMT Nuremberg, Judgment of 1 October 1946 (Prosecutor v. Göring et al.), in: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume XXII, Nürnberg (1948), p. 468; cf. also infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.

  8. 8.

    May 2008, p. 256.

  9. 9.

    Ibid.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., pp. 250–51, 257–59.

  11. 11.

    The point is typically made only with respect to obedience, Walzer 1977, pp. 28, 39, 304; Kahn 2002, p. 2; Kutz 2002; Kutz 2005, pp. 156, 173, 176.

  12. 12.

    Raising concerns along these lines, see Stone 1958, p. 141; Gomaa 2003, p. 65; May 2008, pp. 232, 256–259.

  13. 13.

    May 2008, pp. 229, 256, 339.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.; Solis 1999, p. 520; cf. also infra note 53.

  15. 15.

    Stahn 2010, pp. 877, 880; van Houtte et al. 2008; McDougall 2013, p. 293; McCarthy 2012, pp. 43–44; Schabas 2007, pp. 324–325; Sari 2014, pp. 467, 483; Creegan 2012, p. 62. See also Pobjie 2017, pp. 816–821 (under the current approach to victim status, the State would be the core victim).

  16. 16.

    Walzer 1977, p. 58.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., pp. 58, 61. See also Walzer 2007, p. 221. Offering a similar analogy, see Telford Taylor, Statement of the Prosecution of 30 August 1946 (Prosecutor v. Göring et al.), in: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume XXII, Nürnberg (1948), p. 280. See also Kahn 2008, pp. 54–55.

  18. 18.

    Walzer 2007, p. 221.

  19. 19.

    Walzer 1977, pp. 221, 230, 234; Walzer 2007, pp. 61, 90, 96; Kahn 2004, pp. 262–263.

  20. 20.

    Walzer accepts that the existing legal regime would require some tweaks to properly reflect the imperatives of self-determination, Walzer 1977, pp. 101–108.

  21. 21.

    Infra notes 103–104, 108 and accompanying text.

  22. 22.

    Infra note 103 and accompanying text.

  23. 23.

    Supra note 4.

  24. 24.

    Van Schaack 2012.

  25. 25.

    ICJ, Judgement of 15 June 1954 (Italy v France et al., Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943), 32, ICJ Reports (1954); Akande 2011, pp. 15–26; Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2017, p. 35.

  26. 26.

    ICC Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5 of 14 December 2017, operative para 2.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Akande 2011, pp. 26–28.

  28. 28.

    The activation resolution noted diverging views and affirmed judicial independence. ICC Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5 of 14 December 2017, preambular para 4, and operative para 3; N. Stürchler, ‘The Activation of the Crime of Aggression in Perspective’, 26 January 2018, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-activation-of-the-crime-of-aggression-in-perspective/ (accessed 1 March 2021).

  29. 29.

    Article 15ter Rome Statute.

  30. 30.

    Arguing that Security Council referral is compatible with state consent, see Akande 2011, pp. 35–38.

  31. 31.

    Williams 2016.

  32. 32.

    Article 19 Rome Statute.

  33. 33.

    Article 53 (1) (a) Rome Statute.

  34. 34.

    Articles 87 (7), 93 Rome Statute; Regulations 108–109 ICC Regulations.

  35. 35.

    Rule 103 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

  36. 36.

    Article 72 (4) Rome Statute.

  37. 37.

    Williams 2016, pp. 248–49.

  38. 38.

    See Articles 21 (3), 56 (1) (b), 64 (2), 64 (3) (a), 67, 68, 82 Rome Statute. The possibility of divergence between the accused and her State may be precisely what motivates state intervention in the first place. Williams 2016, p. 246.

  39. 39.

    S. Sewall, ‘The ICC Crime of Aggression and the Changing International Security Landscape, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law’, 9 April 2015, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/remarks/240579.htm (accessed 1 March 2021); Koh and Buchwald 2015, pp. 258–263. On the challenge of inadequate judicial authority: Lauterpacht 1953, pp. 220–21; Blum 2010, p. 87; Taylor 1970, Chapter 5 and p. 184.

  40. 40.

    Kelsen 1945, p. 331; Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, Chapters 1–4; Neff 2005, pp. 225–39; Phillimore 1873, pp. 18–22.

  41. 41.

    Pellet 2015, p. 562.

  42. 42.

    Glennon 2010, p. 102.

  43. 43.

    This is not to say that some critics of aggression do not also criticize the ICC and the very project of international criminal justice. See, e.g., J. Bolton, ‘Protecting American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from International Threats’, 10 September 2018, available at https://fedsoc.org/events/national-security-advisor-john-r-bolton-address (accessed 1 March 2021). However, others seek to draw a distinction, see supra note 6.

  44. 44.

    See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.

  45. 45.

    War crimes can be perpetrated by lone actors, but the focus of international criminal justice tends to be on those ‘committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission’, Article 8 (1) Rome Statute.

  46. 46.

    Danner and Martinez 2005; van Sliedregt 2007, p. 187.

  47. 47.

    ICTY, Judgment of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A (Prosecutor v. Tadić), para 191.

  48. 48.

    Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Lüneburg, Germany from 13–23 August 1946 (Trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen et al.), Judgment of 24 August 1946, p. 241.

  49. 49.

    Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Hamburg, Germany from 4–24 August 1948 (Trial of Feurstein et al.), Judgment of 24 August 1948, pp. 7–8. For later versions of the individual contribution threshold for liability via joint criminal enterprise at the ICTY, see ICTY, Judgement of 2 November 2001, IT-98-30/1-T (Prosecutor v Kvočka et al.), para 309; ICTY, Judgement of 30 November 2005, IT-03-66-T (Prosecutor v Limaj et al.), paras 665–670.

  50. 50.

    ICTY, Judgement of 17 March 2009, IT-00-39-A (Prosecutor v. Krajišnik) paras 215, 695–696.

  51. 51.

    In 2013, the ICTY Appeals Chamber limited liability to contributions ‘specifically directed’ to support the crime. ICTY, Judgement of 28 February 2013, IT-04-81-A (Prosecutor v. Perišić), paras 25–73. However, within a year it reversed course to include knowing contributions. ICTY, Judgement of 23 January 2014, IT-05-87-A (Prosecutor v. Nikola Šainović et al.) paras 1617–1651. The ICC Statute limits aiding and assisting to contributions ‘for the purpose of facilitating the crime’, Article 25 (3) (c) Rome Statute. However, it also allows for liability when an outside actor provides significant support ‘in the knowledge’ of the recipient group’s intention to perpetrate crimes, Article 25 (3) (d) Rome Statute; ICC Pre-Trail Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Chargesof 16 December 2011, No. ICC-01/04-01/10-465 (Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana), paras 276, 277, 288.

  52. 52.

    It is at least dubious in the case of population transfer crimes: Article 8 (2) (b) (viii) Rome Statute; ICC Elements of Crimes, pp. 6–7, 22.

  53. 53.

    On the ICC’s ‘direct or control’ standard: Article 8bis (1) Rome Statute. On the Nuremberg ‘shape or influence’ standard: Military Tribunal XII, Judgment of 27 October 1948 (United States of America v. von Leeb et al.), 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1950), pp. 462, 488; Military Tribunal VI, Judgment of 30 July 1948 (United States v. Krauch et al.), 8 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1949), pp. 1102, 1126. On the distinction: Heller 2007.

  54. 54.

    Article 8 Rome Statute.

  55. 55.

    ICTY, Judgment of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A (Prosecutor v. Tadić), paras 98, 104; ICC Trial Chamber I, Judgment of 5 April 2012, No. 01/04-01/06-2842 (Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo), para 54.

  56. 56.

    ICTY, Judgment of 12 June 2002, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al.), para 59; ICTR, Judgment of 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T (Prosecutor v. Akayesu), para 640.

  57. 57.

    Articles 4, 7 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 2001, Yb ILC, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 31.

  58. 58.

    Article 8 (2) (a), (b), (c), (e) Rome Statute; ICTY, Decision of 2 October 1995, IT-94-1-AR72 (Prosecutor v. Tadić), para 94.

  59. 59.

    Article 8 (2) (a) Rome Statute. On nationality and prisoner of war status: Dinstein 2016, pp. 55–56. On nationality and protected person status for civilians: Article 4 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. For a rare exception to the nationality rule: ICTY, Judgment of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A (Prosecutor v. Tadić), paras 163–17.

  60. 60.

    On the significance of the nexus requirement in the absence of a protected person element, see ICC Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Ntaganda against the ‘Second decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9’ of 15 June 2017, No. ICC-01/04-02/06-1962 (Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda), paras 63, 67. On the nexus factors: supra note 56.

  61. 61.

    On the crime, see Article 8 (2) (b) (viii) Rome Statute; ICC Elements of Crimes, p. 22. On the relationship to sovereignty, see Dinstein 2009, pp. 33–34, 49, 51–52. On the threshold criteria, see Article 2 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; Article 42 Regulations Annexed to The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. This alleged violation is, of course, a key issue in the ICC investigation in Palestine. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecution Request of 22 January 2020 Pursuant to Article 19 (3) for a Ruling on the Court’s Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine (Situation in the State of Palestine) para 95.

  62. 62.

    Article 8 (2) (b) (xiii) Rome Statute; ICC Elements of Crimes, p. 25.

  63. 63.

    Article 7 (2) (a) Rome Statute; Report of the ICL, Sixty-Ninth Session, 1 May–2 June and 3 July–4 August 2017, UN. Doc A/72/10, p. 11, Draft Article 3 (2) (a).

  64. 64.

    Just as war crimes law reflects underlying IHL standards applicable to States, crimes against humanity entail violations of human rights law. Pérez-León Acevedo 2017.

  65. 65.

    Article 7 (2) (h) Rome Statute.

  66. 66.

    Luban 2004, pp. 116–120.

  67. 67.

    From this perspective, the alternative ‘organizational policy’ should be understood in a political way, Luban 2004, p. 117; ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision of 23 January 2012 on the Confirmation of Charges, No. ICC-01/09-01/11-373 (Prosecutor v. Francis Yirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali), Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, para 7.

  68. 68.

    Article 1 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Cassese et al. 2013, p. 133.

  69. 69.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision of 4 March 2009 on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3 (Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, PTC I), paras 209, 216. See also ibid., paras 216–223.

  70. 70.

    ICTR, Appeals Chamber Decision of 22 October 2004, ICTR-98-44-AR72.4 (Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba), para 25.

  71. 71.

    See supra note 41.

  72. 72.

    An important landmark was the imposition of sanctions against apartheid South Africa, UNSC Resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977.

  73. 73.

    Responding to the original challenge on this point: ICTY, Decision of 2 October 1995, IT-94-1-AR72 (Prosecutor v. Tadić), paras 37–47.

  74. 74.

    UNGA Resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005, paras 138–39; UN Doc A/63/677 of 12 January 2009); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, paras 6.13–6.28, available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (accessed 1 March 2021); Peters 2011.

  75. 75.

    This has not been without criticism. Critiquing the focus of the Responsibility to Protect on crimes: Hannum 2009, p. 140. Critiquing the Security Council’s role in international criminal law: Dannenbaum 2020.

  76. 76.

    Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2017, p. 34.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., p. 35. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text.

  78. 78.

    ICJ, Judgement of 15 June 1954 (Italy v France et al., Case of the Monetary Gold Removed From Rome in 1943—Preliminary Question), p. 32, ICJ Reports (1954).

  79. 79.

    Ibid.

  80. 80.

    Article 8bis (2) Rome Statute; Kreß 2017.

  81. 81.

    To be clear, for Akande, criminal courts are competent in this realm as long as the implicated States have all consented to their jurisdiction (regardless of whether they can participate in the proceedings), supra note 27.

  82. 82.

    Article 8 (2) (b) (viii) Rome Statute.

  83. 83.

    See supra note 4. Establishing the occupier’s lack of sovereignty may be sufficient, even if the sovereignty of another specific State is not established. ICJ, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory), paras 91–101, ICJ Reports (2004). On the jurisdictional question regarding the ICC investigation in Palestine, see ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Order of 28 January 2020 Setting the Procedure and the Schedule for the Submission of Observations, ICC-01/18-14 (Situation in the State of Palestine) and associated submissions. In its subsequent decision advising the Prosecutor as to the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction in the context of Palestine, the Pre-Trial Chamber deferred to the approach taken by the U.N. General Assembly in according Palestine non-member observer State status and relied on the work of the ICJ, General Assembly, and U.N. Security Council on Palestinian self-determination and its implications for Palestine’s territorial scope (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision of 5 February 2021 on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine,’ ICC-01/18-143, paras 116–118, 121–123). This approach allowed the Chamber to insist that it was “neither adjudicating a border dispute under international law nor prejudging the question of any future borders. Ibid. paras 113, 130. See also ibid., para. 60. Ultimately, however, the issue will need to be addressed on the merits.

  84. 84.

    Article 49 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

  85. 85.

    See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.

  86. 86.

    Providing a case law-based argument for the applicability of the test in international criminal courts, see Akande 2011, pp. 25–26.

  87. 87.

    Article 25 (4) Rome Statute; ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Response of 30 April 2020 to the Observations of Amici Curiae, Legal Representatives of Victims, and States, ICC-01/18-131 (Situation in the State of Palestine), paras 33, 37.

  88. 88.

    The dispute that prompted the seminal articulation of the indispensable third party doctrine involved the question of whether the UK or Italy could properly claim and take Albanian monetary gold that had been seized by Nazi Germany on the grounds that Albania—not a party to the case—had outstanding debts to each. ICJ, Judgement of 15 June 1954 (Italy v France et al., Case of the Monetary Gold Removed From Rome in 1943—Preliminary Question), p. 32, ICJ Reports (1954). Of course, not all ICJ cases function in that way. See Akande 2011, pp. 17–25. See also ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Response of 30 April 2020 to the Observations of Amici Curiae, Legal Representatives of Victims, and States, ICC-01/18-131 (Situation in the State of Palestine), paras 33–36.

  89. 89.

    Akande 2011, p. 26.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    ICTY, Judgment of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A (Prosecutor v. Tadić), paras 115–145; ibid. (Shahabuddeen separate opinion) paras 1–27; ICJ, Judgement of 26 February 2007 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide), paras 402–407, ICJ Reports (2007).

  92. 92.

    Akande 2011, p. 13.

  93. 93.

    On the debated applicability of official immunities to international crimes, see Symposium on the Present and Future of Foreign Official Immunity (2011) American Journal of International Law Unbound 112.

  94. 94.

    Akande 2011, pp. 34–35; International Law Commission (2017), Report on the work of the sixty-ninth session, UN Doc. A/72/10, Chapter VII: Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, p. 176, Article 7. Debating the exception, see Symposium on the Present and Future of Foreign Official Immunity (2018) American Journal of International Law Unbound 112.

  95. 95.

    Akande 2011, pp. 34–35; International Law Commission (2017), Report on the work of the sixty-ninth session, UN Doc. A/72/10, Chapter VII: Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, p. 172, para 122; ibid., p. 176, Article 7; International Law Commission (2018), Report on the work of the seventieth session, UN Doc. A/73/10, Annex A: Universal criminal Jurisdiction, p. 307 para 3.

  96. 96.

    Scharf 2012.

  97. 97.

    Article 8 (2) (a) (ii) Rome Statute.

  98. 98.

    Kahn 2008, pp. 54–55; Luban 1994, pp. 335–341; Walzer 1977, pp. 58–61; Solera 2007, pp. 427; Creegan 2012, p. 62; Stahn 2010, p. 877; Pobjie 2017, pp. 816–17, 821–22, 825–26; A. Neier et al., ‘Regarding the Crime of Aggression’, Letter to Foreign Ministers, 10 May 2010, available at www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/icc-aggression-letter-20100511.pdf (accessed 1 March 2021).

  99. 99.

    I develop the argument that follows in greater depth in Dannenbaum 2017.

  100. 100.

    See note 111 and accompanying text, below.

  101. 101.

    Taking loosely related positions, see Mégret 2017; Ohlin 2017.

  102. 102.

    Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, Chapters 1–4; Neff 2005, pp. 225–239.

  103. 103.

    On electoral manipulation not rising to a use of armed force, see, e.g., UNGA Resolution 52/119 of 23 February 1998; UNGA Resolution 36/103 of 9 December 1981; UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970; Egan 2017, pp. 174–75. On holding foreign territory not taken through an illegal aggression, consider ICJ, Judgement of 10 October 2002 (Cameroon v. Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea Intervening, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria), p. 303, ICJ Reports (2002); Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Jus ad Bellum–Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8, 19 December, 2005, reprinted in (2005) 16 UNRIAA 457, at 464–467.

  104. 104.

    See Article 8bis (2) (b) and (d) Rome Statute. A proposal to limit criminal aggression to uses of force seeking to take territory or overthrow a government was rejected, Proposal Submitted by Germany: UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.13 of 30 July 1999.

  105. 105.

    On sovereignty violations other than the use of force, see ICJ, Judgment of 27 June 1986 (Nicaragua v. United States of America, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua), paras 202–212, ICJ Reports (1986).

  106. 106.

    ICC Elements of Crimes, p. 43 (elements 3–6).

  107. 107.

    Ibid. (element 3) (emphasis added); Article 8bis (2) Rome Statute (emphasis added).

  108. 108.

    Dannenbaum 2017, pp. 1275–1278; Institut de Droit International 1971, para 7.

  109. 109.

    Article 8bis (1) Rome Statute; ICC Resolution RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010, Annex III, paras 6–7.

  110. 110.

    IMT Nuremberg, Judgment of 1 October 1946 (Prosecutor v. Göring et al.), in: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume XXII, Nürnberg (1948), p. 427; Article 6 (a) Charter of the International Military Tribunal. See also UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, para 5(2).

  111. 111.

    Thus, Mégret suggests that the criminalization of aggression overcomes the ‘humanitarian laundering’ of the jus in bello, rediscovering ‘hidden deaths’ little different from ‘murder’. Mégret 2017, pp. 1420–1423. For Ohlin, aggression resolves what would otherwise be an ‘intolerable’ and ‘absurd’ paradox. Ohlin 2017, pp. 1455, 1458, 1462.

  112. 112.

    See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.

  113. 113.

    This was well understood by Nuremberg prosecutors. Meltzer 1947, pp. 460–61; Weigend 2012, 50; Closing Statement at the Nuremberg Trials (26 July, 1946) by Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain (Prosecutor v. Göring et al.), in: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume XIX, Nürnberg (1948), p. 458.

  114. 114.

    Dannenbaum 2018, pp. 222–226, 235–243.

  115. 115.

    See Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 of 30 October 2018, para 70; Mégret 2017, pp. 1428, 1440, 1444; Schabas 2017, p. 360. On criminal sanctions as part of protecting the human right to life, see ECtHR, Judgement of 28 October 1998, Application no. 87/1997/871/1083 (Osman v. UK), para 115; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 of 29 March 2004, para 8.

  116. 116.

    On humanization, and international criminal law’s place in it, see Meron 2006; Teitel 2011; Cassese et al. 2013, pp. 5–6; Pobjie 2017, p. 820; Schabas 2017, pp. 357, 366.

  117. 117.

    Luban 1994, pp. 335–337, 341; see also Pobjie 2017, pp. 825–826.

  118. 118.

    Also seeking to reconcile the criminalization of aggression and human rights, but via the right to peace, see Schabas 2017, p. 366.

  119. 119.

    Pobjie 2017, p. 822. To recognize that human victims have a long-standing significance here is not to deny the complexity of the history on this issue. Compare Mégret 2017, pp. 1414–1419.

  120. 120.

    See, e.g., Levinson 1921, pp. 12, 14–16, 18, 21–22. On Levinson’s importance, see Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, Chapter 5.

  121. 121.

    Closing Statement at the Nuremberg Trials (26 July, 1946) by Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain (Prosecutor v. Göring et al.), in: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume XIX, Nürnberg (1948), p. 458. See also IMTFE Tokyo, Judgment of 4 November 1948 (Prosecutor v. Araki et al.), in: J Pritchard and S Zaide (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1981), Volume 22, p. 48452.

  122. 122.

    IMTFE Tokyo, Judgment of 4 November 1948 (Prosecutor v. Araki et al.), in: J Pritchard and S Zaide (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1981), Volume 22, pp. 48452–48453, 49576.

  123. 123.

    IMT Nuremberg, Judgment of 1 October 1946 (Prosecutor v. Göring et al.), in: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume XXII, Nürnberg (1948), p. 427.

  124. 124.

    Glennon 2010.

  125. 125.

    ECtHR, Judgement of 22 November 1995, Application no. 20166/92 (SW v. the UK) (Judgment), paras 35–36.

  126. 126.

    Cassese et al. 2013, p. 28.

  127. 127.

    Article 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute.

  128. 128.

    ICC Elements of Crimes, p. 12.

  129. 129.

    SCSL, Judgment of 22 February 2008, SCSL-2004-16-A (Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, and Kanu), paras 182–203.

  130. 130.

    ICTY, Judgement of 14 January 2000, IT-95-16-T (Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al.), para 563, quoting Jean. S. Pictet (1960), 3 Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, p. 39.

  131. 131.

    Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) Rome Statute.

  132. 132.

    Cf. supra note 43.

  133. 133.

    Glennon 2010, p. 101. See also Milanovic 2012, p. 170; Koh and Buchwald 2015.

  134. 134.

    Cf. Dan-Cohen 1984.

  135. 135.

    A key factor here is foreseeability. ECtHR, Judgement of 22 November 1995, Application no. 20166/92 (SW v. UK), para 35; ECtHR, Judgement of 28 March 2000, Application no. 28358/95 (Baranowski v. Poland), para 55.

  136. 136.

    Koh and Buchwald 2015, p. 273; S. Sewall, ‘The ICC Crime of Aggression and the Changing International Security Landscape, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law’, 9 April, 2015, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/remarks/240579.htm (accessed 1 March 2021); Van Schaack 2011; Murphy 2009.

  137. 137.

    Dannenbaum 2017, pp. 1298–1301. See also S. Moyn, ‘Spectacular Wrongs: Gary Bass’s “Freedom’s Battle”’, The Nation, 24 September 2008, available at https://www.thenation.com/article/spectacular-wrongs-gary-basss-freedoms-battle/ (accessed 1 March 2021).

  138. 138.

    Most Serbs Support General Accused Of War Crimes, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 16 March 2011, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/poll_says_most_serbs_support_general_accused_of_war_crimes/24176617.html; War Criminal in The Hague but Still a War Hero in Croatia, Euronews. 1 December 2017, available at https://www.euronews.com/2017/12/01/war-criminal-in-the-hague-but-still-a-war-hero-in-croatia (accessed 1 March 2021); Milanovic 2016; International Committee of the Red Cross 2016, p. 10; Moore 1989, pp. 323–324. For a range of positions on torture: Levinson 2004.

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Dannenbaum, T. (2022). Aggression and Atrocity—The Interstate Element, Politics, and Individual Responsibility. In: Bock, S., Conze, E. (eds) Rethinking the Crime of Aggression. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-467-9_12

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