Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) decision-support systems significantly impact how States make warfare decisions, conduct hostilities, and whether they comply with international humanitarian law. Decision-support systems, even if they do not autonomously execute targets, can play a critical role in the long chain of human-machine and machine-machine decision-making infrastructure, thus contributing to the co-production of hostilities.
Due to a lack of a definition of the treaty terms weapons, means or methods of warfare, it is unclear whether non-weaponized AI decision-support systems should be subjected to a legal review prescribed by Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I. It remains a challenge to determine exactly what should be subjected to review beyond weapons.
This chapter suggests that based on the following four criteria it can be determined whether an item should be subjected to a legal review: (i) it poses a challenge to the application of international humanitarian law; (ii) it is integral to military decision-making; (iii) it has a significant impact on military operations; (iv) and it contributes to critical offensive capabilities. These four criteria are derived from a detailed analysis of the conceptualization of the terms weapons, means or methods of warfare by states. If an item meets all four criteria, it should not be deployed without the issue of legality being explored with care.
By applying the legal review to AI decision-support systems, States fulfil the duty to observe international humanitarian law in decision-making and mitigate risks to unlawful conduct in warfare. The author further promotes the conceptualization of Article 36 as a review of technologies of warfare.
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Notes
- 1.
The definition of the autonomous weapon systems is highly contested. I use here the definition provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross that has been widely referenced by scholars. See ICRC 2014.
- 2.
For more definitions of the decision-support systems, see Şuşnea 2012, pp 132–133.
- 3.
It may be questioned whether the distinction between decision-making and decision-support systems is useful. In fact, autonomy comes in degrees and AI technologies will fall somewhere on the scale in between these two categories. For the purposes of this chapter, the terms are used only to highlight the risks of excluding decision-support systems from the legal review due to their non-full autonomy in acting upon algorithmic recommendations and the involvement of the human in this process.
- 4.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (Additional Protocol I), Article 36.
- 5.
UN General Assembly (2017) Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Weapons Review Mechanism submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, para 29.
- 6.
UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (2018) Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, paras 9, 28.
- 7.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (VCLT), Article 31.
- 8.
Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, para 25.
- 9.
VCLT, above n 7, Article 31(3)(a) and Article (3)(b); and Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, para 26.
- 10.
Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, para 78. The authors explain regarding the interpretation of state practice: “No particular form is required, so that official statements or manuals, diplomatic correspondence, press releases, transactions, votes on resolutions in international organizations are just as relevant as national acts of legislation or judicial decisions. In fact, ‘practice’ in this respect is not limited to the central government authorities of states, rather any public body acting in an official capacity can contribute to demonstrating the state’s position towards its treaty commitments.”
- 11.
It should be noted that VLTC, Article 31 requires the interpretation to be reasonable, but does not necessarily have to be reflected through practice of all Parties. Therefore, it suffices to interpret the existing state practice, as long as other Parties have not expressly objected to such application. Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, para 83.
- 12.
Interpretation of Article 36 should not necessarily include the subsequent practice of the United States, as it is not a party to API. Nevertheless, the author chose to include the United States in this analysis since it is one of the oldest known legal review mechanisms in existence and has thus influenced the formation of legal review practices in other states. See Jevglevskaja 2018, footnote 84. The practice of the United States, however, is never taken alone and is only analyzed in relation to the practice of States party to API.
- 13.
Sandoz et al. 1987.
- 14.
Ibid., p 389.
- 15.
Ibid., p 390.
- 16.
Declaration of St. Petersburg of 11 December 1868 Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of certain Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, opened for signature 29 November 1868 (entered into force 11 December 1868).
- 17.
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, (entered into force 10 March 1908) (Hague Regulation IV), Article 22.
- 18.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, rule 70.
- 19.
The enforcement of relevant legal mechanisms that limit the right to choose means and methods of warfare was particularly important for smaller Parties that wanted to ensure that their more powerful counterparts do not develop nor acquire weapons that violate principles of IHL. Sandoz et al. (1987), pp 422–424.
- 20.
Additional Protocol I, above n 4, Article 36.
- 21.
Lawand (2006), pp 945–948.
- 22.
Ibid., p 954.
- 23.
Sandoz et al. 1987, p 427.
- 24.
Verdiesen et al. 2020
- 25.
Ibid.
- 26.
Lawand 2006, p 949.
- 27.
Article 36 is only one of the many obligations of Parties that contribute to the accountability and compliance of States with IHL rules and principles. For example, Article 82 requires Parties to ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders. The relation between Article 36 review and Article 82 legal advice is discussed in the following sections.
- 28.
Additional Protocol I, above n 4, Article 36.
- 29.
UN General Assembly (2017) Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Weapons Review Mechanism submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, para 26.
- 30.
McClelland 2003.
- 31.
Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, para 25.
- 32.
VCLT, above n 7, Article 31(3)(a) and Article (3)(b); and Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, para 26.
- 33.
UN General Assembly (2017) Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Weapons Review Mechanism submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, para 3(c).
- 34.
- 35.
Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, para 78. Cf. footnote 10.
- 36.
Lawand 2006, p 9.
- 37.
Boulanin and Verbruggen 2017b.
- 38.
Reservations made by the United Kingdom and Germany refer to national legislations and do not represent official reservations to AD1; Boulanin and Verbruggen 2017b.
- 39.
UN General Assembly (2017) Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Weapons Review Mechanism submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, para 27.
- 40.
Danish Ministry of Defence 2016, p 380.
- 41.
The United States is not a party to the API, nevertheless, it has implemented a review of weapons as a matter of policy. See also above n 12.
- 42.
UN General Assembly (2017) Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Weapons Review Mechanism submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, para 28.
- 43.
Ibid.
- 44.
Ibid.
- 45.
Ekelhof 2017.
- 46.
UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (2018) Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, paras 9, 28.
- 47.
UN General Assembly (2017) Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Weapons Review Mechanism submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, para 29.
- 48.
Sandoz et al. 1987, pp 421–428.
- 49.
McClelland 2003, p 405.
- 50.
- 51.
An example of the destructive capabilities of cyber means is the use of the Stuxnet malicious computer worm to disturb the workings of the centrifuges of the Iranian Natanz nuclear plant. The extent to which Stuxnet was able to meddle in the workings of a nuclear plant displays the threats it may pose to indirectly cause harm, damage and injury.
- 52.
- 53.
De Tomas Colatin and Väljataga 2020, p 5.
- 54.
UN General Assembly (2015) Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/70/174, para 28(b-f).
- 55.
Schmitt 2017, Rule 110.
- 56.
- 57.
De Tomas Colatin and Väljataga 2020, p 7.
- 58.
Lewis 2012, p 66.
- 59.
Boothby 2013, p 387. This interpretation is also reflected in Lawand 2006, p 932; and UN General Assembly (2017) Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Weapons Review Mechanism submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, para 30.
- 60.
Boulanin and Verbruggen 2017a.
- 61.
Boothby 2013, p 170.
- 62.
Biller and Schmitt 2019, pp 217–219.
- 63.
The United Kingdom include the military doctrine under the review of the methods of warfare. See UK Ministry of Defence 2016.
- 64.
Germany under the term methods of warfare includes “planning, concepts or doctrines for the military operations designed to counter, interfere or support enemy military operations and capabilities to interfere or support their own military operations and capabilities”. See Federal Ministry of Defence 2016.
- 65.
- 66.
Ekelhof 2018, p 16.
- 67.
Phillips-Wren 2012.
- 68.
Rogoway 2015.
- 69.
Ibid.
- 70.
Trevithick 2020.
- 71.
- 72.
Additional Protocol I, above n 4, Article 48.
- 73.
Additional Protocol I, above n 4, Articles 51(2) and 52(2).
- 74.
The exception to this dichotomy is the status of unlawful combatants, persons that are “fighters by night and farmers by day”, which leads to distinct legal consequences to their protection. See Dinstein 2004, p 28.
- 75.
Dinstein 2004, pp 47–51.
- 76.
Melzer 2009, pp 51–55.
- 77.
Ibid., pp 58–61.
- 78.
- 79.
- 80.
Additional Protocol 1, above n 4, Article 47(2).
- 81.
State of Israel 2009, p 83.
- 82.
Farres Jimenez 2019, p 3.
- 83.
US National Security Agency 2007.
- 84.
Ibid.
- 85.
Ibid.
- 86.
Farres Jimenez 2019, p 2.
- 87.
Leaked presentation slides of the Skynet project say: “Skynet applies complex combinations of geospatial, geothermal, pattern-of-life, and travel analytics to bulk DNR data to identify patterns of suspect activity”. SRC Defense 2020.
- 88.
Blank 2012, p 774.
- 89.
Chertoff and Manfredi 2017, p 39.
- 90.
Blank 2012, pp 766–774.
- 91.
Ibid., p 777.
- 92.
- 93.
Shanker and Richtel 2011.
- 94.
Ibid.
- 95.
de Laat 2018, pp 525–541.
- 96.
Ars Technica (2016) The NSA’s SKYNET Program May Be Killing Thousands of Innocent People. arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/02/the-nsas-skynet-program-may-be-killing-thousands-of-innocent-people/. Accessed 10 October 2020.
- 97.
Boulanin et al. 2020, p 16.
- 98.
- 99.
Weisgerber 2017.
- 100.
Lowe 2019.
- 101.
Ibid.
- 102.
Weisgerber 2017.
- 103.
Ibid.; Holland 2019b.
- 104.
- 105.
Binns 2020.
- 106.
Robbins 2016.
- 107.
Advisory Council on International Affairs 2015.
- 108.
Chavannes and Arkhipov-Goyal 2019, p 16.
- 109.
The term ‘human in-the-loop’ lacks a common definition. In general terms, it refers to the possibility of a human to intervene before the execution of algorithmic decisions; Boulanin et al. 2020.
- 110.
McGregor 2019.
- 111.
Skitka et al. 1999, pp 999–1002.
- 112.
Ibid., p 1001; and Mittelstadt et al. 2016, p 3.
- 113.
Skitka et al. 1999, p 1004.
- 114.
Parasuraman and Manzey 2010, p 397.
- 115.
Ibid., p 392.
- 116.
Holland 2019a.
- 117.
Boothby 2016, pp 251–252.
- 118.
Radin 2019.
- 119.
Skitka et al. 1999, pp 999–1002.
- 120.
Shanker and Richtel 2011.
- 121.
Bloomberg 2016.
- 122.
Trevithick 2020.
- 123.
SRC Defense 2020, p 2.
- 124.
Ibid.
- 125.
Deeks et al. 2018, p 17.
- 126.
Ibid.
- 127.
Ekelhof 2018, p 17.
- 128.
McClelland 2003, p 405.
- 129.
Lewis 2012, p 66.
- 130.
ICRC 2019, p 7.
- 131.
Lewis 2012, pp 6–9.
- 132.
Holland 2020.
- 133.
Ekelhof 2018, p 23.
- 134.
Arvidsson 2018, p 23.
- 135.
- 136.
ICRC 2019, p 2.
- 137.
Boulanin and Verbruggen 2017a, pp 21–25.
- 138.
ICRC 2019, p 2.
- 139.
Lawand 2006, p 952.
- 140.
Additional Protocol I, above n 4, Article 82.
- 141.
Berger 2017, p 658.
- 142.
Ibid.
- 143.
Copeland and Sanders 2021.
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Treaties
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980)
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Klonowska, K. (2022). Article 36: Review of AI Decision-Support Systems and Other Emerging Technologies of Warfare. In: Gill, T.D., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Mignot-Mahdavi, R. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 23 (2020). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 23. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-491-4_6
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