Skip to main content

The Collapse Scenario: From Survival to Disintegration

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Transition beyond Denuclearisation
  • 122 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter this chapter shifts to an examination of how the North Korean regime has managed to survive thus far, despite the numerous dysfunctions in its economic system. The chapter analyzes the five factors that have served to safeguard the regime’s survival despite worsening conditions in North Korea and explain that, nevertheless, if the regime tries to survive with nuclear weapons, the likelihood of collapse is high. Finally, it offers a forecast of the two distinct paths the DPRK can now take—one in which Kim Jong Un seeks survival with nuclear weapons, thus instigating collapse, contrasted with one that assures survival and prosperity in exchange for denuclearization.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    https://www.wfp.org/news/after-worst-harvest-ten-years-10-million-people-dprk-face-imminent-food-shortages.

  2. 2.

    Joong-Ang Ilbo reports. 2017. “Korea’s economic assistance should be reformed and opened by the U.S. government.” [Hangukgyungjeajiwon, michejeabojangeurobukgyehteokgaebanghaeya]. Retrieved from https://news.joins.com/article/22074358.

  3. 3.

    Myers, Brian Reynolds. 2010. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See themselves and why it matters. New York: Melville House.

  4. 4.

    Everard, John. 2012. Only Beautiful, Please: A British Diplomat in North Korea. Baltimore: The Brooking Institution.

  5. 5.

    Kim, Suki. 2014. Without you, there is no us: my time with the sons of North Korea’s elites. New York: Crown Publishers.

  6. 6.

    Jang, Jin-sung. 2014. Dear Leader. London: Ebury Publishing.

  7. 7.

    Stricker, Andrea & Albright, David. 2019. “How North Korea can be convinced to give up nuclear weapons.” NK News. Retrieved from https://www.nknews.org/2019/01/how-north-korea-can-be-convinced-to-give-up-nuclear-weapons/.

  8. 8.

    Martin, Bradley K. 2019. “How the US president could earn his Nobel”. Asia Times. Retrieved from https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/06/article/how-the-us-president-could-earn-his-nobel/.

  9. 9.

    Battacharjee, Anjali & Salama, Sammy. 2003. Libya and Nonproliferation. Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Braut-Hegghammer, Malfrid. 2009. “Libya’s Nuclear Intentions: Ambition and Ambivalence.” Center Contemporary Conflict. Retrieved from http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/braut-hegghammerApr09.pdf; Squassoni, Sharon & Feickert, Andrew. 2004. Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress; US Congress. 1996. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_cr/h960618b.htm.

  10. 10.

    Bang, Chan Young. 1995. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at a crossroad, Park Young-sa. pp. 99, 232–233.

  11. 11.

    Yonhap. 2019. “N. Korea changes constitution to make Kim Jong-un official head of state.” The Korea Herald. Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190711000731.

  12. 12.

    Fifield, Anna. 2019. The Great Successor: The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un. New York: Public Affairs. p. 104.

  13. 13.

    KINU. 2007. White Paper on human Rights in North Korea. Seoul: Centre for North Korean human Rights Studies.

  14. 14.

    NKBD Database Center for North Korean Human Rights. Findings. Retrieved from http://www.nkdb.org/en/database/findings.php.

  15. 15.

    Shevardnadze, Eduard. 1991. The Future Belongs to Freedom. New York: The Free Press. pp. 57–58.

  16. 16.

    DailyNK. 2018. “Report: The Creation of the North Korean Market System.” Retrieved from https://www.dailynk.com/english/notices/?mod=document&uid=68.

  17. 17.

    Cha, Victor & Collins, Lisa. 2018. “The Markets: Private Economy and Capitalism in North Korea?” Beyond Parallel. Retrieved from https://beyondparallel.csis.org/markets-private-economy-capitalism-north-korea/. The CSIS websites cites an official document issued by the DPRK government to confirm and explain the setting up and ‘unofficial’ regulation of markets: namely the “Korea’s Commercial Order of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” No. 48, May 20, 2003. Pyongyang. “Commercial Holy Place of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” [Joshunminjujuui inmingonghwaguk sangeopjishi]. No. 48, May 20, 2003). The document is Pyongyang, “Korea’s Commercial Order of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” No. 48, May 20, 2003. 평양, “조선민주주의인민공화국 상업성지시,” 제48호, 2003년 5월 20일 as quoted in https://beyondparallel.csis.org/markets-private-economy-capitalism-north-korea/.

  18. 18.

    Dong, Yong-seung. 1997. “The Impact of the Black Market Spread on the North Korean Economy.” [Amsijang hwaksani bukhangyeongjeaae michineun yeonghyang]. Monthly Samsung Economic Group.

  19. 19.

    Grossman, Gregory. 1977. “The ‘Second Economy’ of USSR.” Problems of Communism 26 (5); Schophlin, George. 1993. Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945–1992. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

  20. 20.

    Nee, Victor & Lian, Peng. 1994. “Sleeping with the enemy: why communications love the market.” Theory and Society 23 (2).

  21. 21.

    Jeong, Se-jin. 2000. From Plan to Market: Political Economy of the North Korean regime [Gyehuyeseo sijanguro: Bukhan chejebyendong jeongchi kyungje yengu]. Seoul: Hanul Academy. pp. 20–32.

  22. 22.

    Huh, Man-ho. 2008. Reform of North Korea: Openness and Human Rights [Bukhanui gaehyeokgaebanggwainkwon]. Seoul: Master Culture History. p. 36.

  23. 23.

    Huh, Man-ho. 2008. Reform of North Korea: Openness and Human Rights [Bukhanui gaehyeokgaebanggwainkwon]. Seoul: Master Culture History. p. 36.

  24. 24.

    Park, Soon-sung and others. 2009. “North Korean defectors in the process of defection and resettlement.” [Talbuk yeosunguitalbukmit jungchak gwajeongaeseouiinkwonchimhaesiltaejosha]. National Human Rights Commission of Korea. p. 53.

  25. 25.

    21 Yang, Moon-soo. 2014. Economy and Society in the Kim Jong-un Era: New Relations Between the State and the Market [Kimjeongeunshidaeuigyeongjeawasahoe: gukgawasijangui saerowoon gwangye]. “Chapter 10. Marketization and Gender of North Korea.” Seoul: Hanul Academy. p. 302.

  26. 26.

    Yang, Moon-soo. 2014. Economy and society in the Kim Jong-un era: New relations between the state and the market [Kimjeongeunshidaeuigyeongjeawasahoe: gukgawasijangui saerowoon gwangye]. “Chapter 10, Marketization and Gender of North Korea.” Seoul: Hanul Academy. p. 303.

  27. 27.

    Tongilwon, 1990. North Korean dog ‘91’ [Bukhangaeyo]. Seoul: Tongilwon. p. 238.

  28. 28.

    Huh, Man-ho. 2008. Reform of North Korea. Openness and Human Rights [Bukhanui gaehyeokgaebanggwainkwon]. Seoul: Master Culture History. p. 39.

  29. 29.

    Jones-Rooy, Andrea & Prusher, Ilene. 2018. “Even Dictators Like Kim Jong Un Need To Keep Some People Happy.” FiveThirtyEight. Retrieved from https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/even-dictators-like-kim-jong-un-need-to-keep-some-people-happy/; Chotiner, Isaac. 2019. “The early life of Kim Jong Un.” The New Yorker. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-early-life-of-kim-jong-un; Huang, Kristin. 2017. “Where’s the money coming from for North Korea’s nuclear programme?” South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2111427/wheres-money-coming-north-koreas-nuclear-programme.

  30. 30.

    Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Smith, Alistair. 2010. “Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance.” American Journal of Political Science 54: 936–950; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Smith, Alistair. 2011. A Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics. New York: Public Affairs. p. 49; Bove, Vincenzo & Rivera, Mauricio. 2015. “Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies.” International Interactions 41 (3): 456; Svolik, Milan. 2009. “Power-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (2): 477–494; Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A. & Verdier, Thierry. 2004. “Kleptocracy and Divide and Rule: A Model of Personal Rule.” Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2): 162–192; Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin. 2011. “Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off.” Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (5): 903–930.

  31. 31.

    McEachern, Patrick. 2010. Inside the red box: North Korea’s post-totalitarian politics. New York: Columbia University Press; Mahdavi, Paasha & Ishiyama, John. 2019. “Dynamics of the inner elite in dictatorships: Evidence from North Korea.” Comparative Politics. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.5129/001041520X15652680065751; Koo, Bon Sang. 2017. “Unique or Common? The Kim Jong Un Regime and Modern Authoritarianism.” North Korean Review 13 (2): 5–23; Frank, Rudiger & Park, Phillip H. 2012. “From Monolithic Totalitarian to Collective Authoritarian Leadership? Performance-Based Legitimacy and Power Transfer in North Korea.” North Korean Review 8 (2): 32–49; Wintrobe, Ronald. 2013. “North Korea as a Military Dictatorship.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 19 (3): 459–471; Myers, Brian Reynolds. 2010. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See themselves and why it matters. New York: Melville House. Myers, Brian Reynolds. 2017. “What the West gets wrong about North Korea’s motives, and why some South Koreans admire the North.” The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-north-koreas-motives-and-why-some-south-koreans-admire-the-north-83639.

  32. 32.

    Silberstein, Benjamin Katzeff. 2018. “Don’t Forget: North Korea Is a Country, Too.” The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/dont-forget-north-korea-is-a-country-too/; Myers, Brian Reynolds. 2017. “What the West gets wrong about North Korea’s motives, and why some South Koreans admire the North.” The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-north-koreas-motives-and-why-some-south-koreans-admire-the-north-83639; Myers, Brian Reynolds. 2011. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See themselves and why it matters. New York: Melville House. Retrieved from https://www.amazon.com/Cleanest-Race-Koreans-Themselves-Matters/dp/1935554344.

  33. 33.

    McEachern, Patrick. 2008. Interest Groups in North Korean Politics. Journal of Asian Studies 8: 235–258. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/23418692?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents; McEachern, Patrick. 2009. Inside the red box: North Korea’s post-totalitarian politics. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2062&context=gradschool_dissertations.

  34. 34.

    McEachern, Patrick. 2009. Inside the red box: North Korea’s post-totalitarian politics. City: Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2062&context=gradschool_dissertations.

  35. 35.

    Kim, Youngjun. 2017. Origins of the North Korean Garrison State. New York: Routledge.

  36. 36.

    McEachern, Patrick. 2010. Inside the red box: North Korea’s post-totalitarian politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

  37. 37.

    Myers, Brian Reynolds. 2010. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See themselves and why it matters. New York: Melville House.

  38. 38.

    Lipes, Joshua. 2018. “Kim Jong Un Slush Fund ‘Running Out’ as North Korea Tests Weapons Despite Sanctions.” Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/fund-01252018143318.html; Smith, Nicola. 2018. “Kim Jong-un’s ‘inheritance dwindling’ after expensive missile tests and vanity projects.” The Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/29/kim-jong-uns-inheritance-dwindling-expensive-missile-tests-vanity/; Lee, Christy. 2019. “Sanctions Threaten North Korea’s Old and New Elites.” VOA News. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/sanctions-threaten-north-koreas-old-and-new-elites.

  39. 39.

    U.S. Department of the Treasury. (n.d.) “North Korea Sanctions.” Retrieved from https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/nkorea.aspx.

  40. 40.

    Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. H.R.3364. 115th Congress. 2017.

  41. 41.

    Stanton, Joshua, Lee, Sung-Yoon & Klingner, Bruce. 2017. “Getting Tough on North Korea. How to Hit Pyongyang Where It Hurts.” Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-04-17/getting-tough-north-korea.

  42. 42.

    Choe, Sang-Hun. 2019. “South Korea Announces $8 Million Aid Package for North.” The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/asia/north-korea-aid-south.html.

  43. 43.

    N.A. April 7, 2018. China applies its own maximum pressure policy on Pyongyang. CNBC.

    https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/07/china-applies-its-own-maximum-pressure-policy-on-pyongyang.html. Accessed August 14, 2019.

  44. 44.

    World Food Program DPR Korea. (2019). World Food Program DPR Korea 2019–2021. Pyongyang.

  45. 45.

    The Ministry of Unification, Policy on North Korean Defectors, 2019.

  46. 46.

    Yonhap. 2019. “Trump says ‘lot of things going on’ regarding NK, raises prospects of ‘major rebuild’.” The Korea Herald. Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20191022000142.

  47. 47.

    Kim, Jaewon. 2019. “Ex-North Korean diplomat says Kim will never give up nuclear arms.” Nikkei Asian Review. Retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Trump-Kim-Summit/Ex-North-Korean-diplomat-says-Kim-will-never-give-up-nuclear-arms.

  48. 48.

    Smith. Nicola. 2018. “North Korea warns Kim will not give up nuclear weapons until US removes threat.” The Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/21/north-korea-warns-will-not-give-nuclear-weapons-us-removes-threat/.

  49. 49.

    Richardson, Davis. 2019. “North Korea ‘Unlikely to Give Up’ Nuclear Arsenal, Says National Security Team.” Observer. Retrieved from https://observer.com/2019/01/north-korea-nuclear-arsenal-national-security-team/.

Bibliography

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Chan Young Bang .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Bang, C.Y. (2020). The Collapse Scenario: From Survival to Disintegration. In: Transition beyond Denuclearisation. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4316-6_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics