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Impact of Carbon Emission on the Seller Buyer Model: A Stackelberg Game Approach

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Advances in Industrial and Production Engineering (FLAME 2022)

Abstract

Through this study, the supply chain model i.e., seller-buyer model is investigated using carbon emissions costs, i.e., the projected maximum cost incurred by a sector. This study examines the supply chain model in which the buyer imposes unit price and unit marketing expenditure, controls the item's demand. The setup costs, order costs, and expenses are related to the carbon emissions of manufacturing and transportation activities in a two-tiered coordinated supply chain. A supply chain model is developed using a non-cooperative game theoretical method to support the interaction and democracy of the supply chain's buyers and sellers. The Stackelberg game strategy, in which the leader is one of the participants and the other has the role of the follower, and he is employed in the non-cooperative method. Finally, numerical examples, including sensitivity analysis, are shown to highlight the significance of the theory offered in the work and this shows in the Seller-Stackelberg model, both the buyer and the seller profit when the α parameter changes, whereas in the Buyer-Stackelberg model, both the buyer and the seller profit when the β parameter changes.

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Correspondence to Mandeep Mittal .

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Raghav, T., Mittal, M., Yadav, R. (2023). Impact of Carbon Emission on the Seller Buyer Model: A Stackelberg Game Approach. In: Phanden, R.K., Kumar, R., Pandey, P.M., Chakraborty, A. (eds) Advances in Industrial and Production Engineering. FLAME 2022. Lecture Notes in Mechanical Engineering. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1328-2_34

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1328-2_34

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-99-1327-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-99-1328-2

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