This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J.C., and Willig, R.D. (1982). Contestable markets and the theory of industry structure. Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich.
Baumol, W.J. (1982). Applied fairness theory and rationing policy. American Economic Review 72(4): 639–656.
Baumol, W.J. (1986). Superfairness. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Becker, G.S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 96(3): 371–400.
Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy (February).
Buchanan, J.M. (1959). Positive economics, welfare economics and political economy. Journal of Law and Economics 2(October): 124–138.
Buchanan, J.M. (1969). Cost and choice. Chicago: Markham.
Buchanan, J.M. (1986). Liberty, market and state, Chaps. 3 and 10. New York University Press.
Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D., and Tullock, G., Eds. (1980). Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A & M Press.
Buchanan, J.M., and Tullock, G. (1975). Polluter's profits and political response: Direct control versus taxes. American Economic Review 65(March): 139–147.
Crew, M.A., and Kleindorfer, P.R. (1986). The economics of public utility regulation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Crew, M.A., and Rowley, C.K. (1986). Regulation as an instrument for industrial policy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Crew, M.A., and Rowley, C.K. (1987). The myth of disinterest in deregulation. In C.K. Rowley, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), The political economy of rent-seeking. Kluwer.
Demsetz, H. (1964). The exchange and enforcement of property rights. Journal of Law and Economics 3(October): 11–26.
Demsetz, H. (1969). Information and efficiency: Another viewpoint. Journal of Law and Economics 3(1): 1–22.
Downs, A. (1957) An economic theory of democracy. Harper and Row.
Holcombe, R.G. (1983). Applied fairness theory: Comment American Economic Review 73(5): 1153–1156.
Kalt, J.P., and Zuppan, M.A. (1984). Capture ideology in the economic theory of politics. American Economic Review 74(July): 279–300.
Leibenstein, H. (1966). Allocative efficiency versus X-efficiency. American Economic Review 56(June): 392–415.
McChesney, F.S. (1987). Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation. Journal of Legal Studies 12(1): 101–118.
Niskanen, W.A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. New York: Aldine-Atherton.
North, D.C. (1986). The new institutional analysis. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (March): 230–237.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state and utopia. Basic Books.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press.
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19(August): 211–240.
Posner, R.A. (1975). The social costs of monopoly regulation. Journal of Political Economy 83(August): 807–827.
Posner, R.A. (1986). Economic analysis of law. Little Brown.
Rawls, J. (1973). A theory of justice. Oxford University Press.
Rowley, C.K. (1984). The relevance of the median voter theorem. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (March): 104–135.
Rowley, C.K., and Elgin, R. (1985). Toward a theory of bureaucratic behaviour. In D. Greenaway, and G.K. Shaw (Eds.), Public choice, public finance and public policy. B. Blackwell.
Rowley, C.K., and Peacock, A.T. (1975). Welfare economics: A liberal restatement. Martin Robertson.
Rowley, C.K., and Tollison, R.D. (1986). Rent-seeking and trade protection. The Swiss Review of International Economic Relations (September): 141–166.
Sen, A. (1973). On economic equality. Oxford University Press.
Stigler, G.J. (1971). The economic theory of regulation. Bell Journal of Economics 2(1): 3–21.
Stigler, G.J. (1976). Xistence of X-efficiency. American Economic Review 66(1): 213–216.
Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal 5(June): 224–232.
Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O.E. (1976). Franchise bidding for natural monopoly — in general and with respect to CATV. Bell Journal of Economics, pp. 73–104.
Williamson, O.E. (1979). Transaction cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 233–261.
Wiseman, J. (1957). The theory of public utility price: An empty box. Oxford Economic Papers (February): 56–74.
Zajac, E.E. (1987). Toward a theory of perceived economic justice in regulation. Bell Laboratories Discussion Paper, No. 2335 (January).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Rutgers University
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Crew, M.A., Rowley, C.K. Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation. Public Choice 57, 49–67 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00052260
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00052260