Summary and conclusions
The marginal abstention hypothesis is that once at the polls, individuals are more likely to vote in the closer races on the ballot and to abstain from voting in the safer races. This hypothesis is a straightforward extension of the rational voting model. In previous empirical applications of the rational voter theory, voter turnout and voting in a given election are treated as one in the same. These studies have produced mixed results. When applied to the problem of explaining marginal voting behavior, the theory works well.
Data on a recent sample of U.S. House and Senate elections is used to test the marginal abstention hypothesis. In the average Congressional District, about three percent more people vote in the Senate race than in the House race. This difference varies in a fashion predictable by the theory.
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We are grateful to Aslam Hameed for statistical assistance, and to Henry Butler, Martin Sabo, Bill Shughart, Robert Tollison, Gordon Tullock, and Asghar Zardkoohi for suggestions. We are responsible for any errors. The Center for Study of Public Choice and the Graduate School, GMU, provided financial support for the research.
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Crain, W.M., Leavens, D.R. & Abbot, L. Voting and not voting at the same time. Public Choice 53, 221–229 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127347
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127347