Abstract
Numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors. This paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth: fiscal decentralization. The results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy
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The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Angelo R. Mascaro, Gordon Tullock and an anonymous referee. Views expressed here are of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Treasury.
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Marlow, M.L. Fiscal decentralization and government size. Public Choice 56, 259–269 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130275
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130275