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Decentralizing an economy: The role of bureaucratic corruption in China's economic reforms

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References

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  1. Department of Economics, University of Arizona, 85721, Tucson, AZ

    Barbara N. Sands

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  1. Barbara N. Sands
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Sands, B.N. Decentralizing an economy: The role of bureaucratic corruption in China's economic reforms. Public Choice 65, 85–91 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139292

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139292

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