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An economic analysis of the voting on Michigan's tax and expenditure limitation amendment

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Abstract

This paper investigates electorate behavior on Proposal C, a proposed amendment to the Michigan constitution, whose passage would have limited taxes and expenditures in the State of Michigan. Voting behavior was analyzed within the framework of the basic hypotheses: that the electorate tended to vote on Proposal C in its economic interests, narrowly conceived. The results were contradictory, with some groups voting against their economic interests and others voting as the hypothesis would predict. Further, a relatively low percentage of the total voting variance was explained, indicating that perhaps other variables than economic ones influenced voting behavior.

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Authors
  1. Steve Mariotti
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Additional information

The author is a Liberty Fund Fellow studying economics at the Institute for Humane Studies. This paper is part of a project written for Paul W. McCracken at the University of Michigan's Graduate School of Business Administration. Edward Mitchell and William Niskanen are thanked for their advice and encouragement. Roger Garrison and Mickey Levy gave useful advice on data collection and methodology.

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Mariotti, S. An economic analysis of the voting on Michigan's tax and expenditure limitation amendment. Public Choice 33, 15–26 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154681

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154681

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