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Notes on the so-called incompleteness problem and on the proposed alternative concept of rational behavior

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Abstract

In reply to McClennen, the paper argues that his criticism is based on a mistaken assumption about the meaning of rationality postulates, to be called the ‘Implication Principle’. Once we realize that the Implication Principle has no validity, McClennen's criticisms of what he calls the ‘Reductio Argument’ and what he calls the ‘Incentive Argument’ fall to the ground. The rest of the paper criticizes the rationality concept McClennen proposes in lieu of that used by orthodox game theory. It is argued that McClennen's concept is inconsistent with the behavior of real-life intelligent egoists; it is incompatible with the way ‘payoffs’ are defined in game theory; and it would be highly dangerous as a practical guide to human behavior.

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The author is indebted to the National Science Foundation for financial support trough Grant GS-3222, administered through the Center for Research in Management Science, University of California, Berkeley.

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Harsanyi, J.C. Notes on the so-called incompleteness problem and on the proposed alternative concept of rational behavior. Theor Decis 2, 342–352 (1972). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00160955

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