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Accidental (‘non-substantial’) theory change and theory dislodgement: To what extent logic can contribute to a better understanding of certain phenomena in the dynamics of theories

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Stegmüller, W. Accidental (‘non-substantial’) theory change and theory dislodgement: To what extent logic can contribute to a better understanding of certain phenomena in the dynamics of theories. Erkenntnis 10, 147–178 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204968

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