Abstract
Prominent thinkers such as Kripke and Rescher hold that Russell has no modal logic, even that Russell was indisposed toward modal logic. In Part I, I show that Russell had a modal logic which he repeatedly described and that Russell repeatedly endorsed Leibniz's multiplicity of possible worlds. In Part II, I describe Russell's theory as having three ontological levels. In Part III, I describe six Parmenidean theories of being Russell held, including: literal in 1903; universal in 1912; timeless in 1914; transcendental in 1918–1948. The transcendental theory underlies the primary level of Russell's modal logic. In Part IV, I examine Rescher's view that Russell and modal logic did not mix.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
The United States Naval Academy Research Council kindly provided a summer 1988 research grant for work on this essay. This essay was presented at the Bertrand Russell Society Meeting during the December 1988 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, D.C.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Dejnozka, J. The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality. Erkenntnis 32, 383–418 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00216469
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00216469