Abstract
This note contains a generalization of the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy and of the corresponding game dynamics from 2-person to n-person games. This broader framework also allows modelling of several interacting populations or of populations containing different “types” of individuals, for example males and females.
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Palm, G. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics for n-person games. J. Math. Biology 19, 329–334 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00277103
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00277103