Abstract
The relationship between the distribution of an interest group's members (i.e., voters) across legislative districts and the group's ability to influence government policy is not well understood. We propose a simple model of interest groups and legislative decisionmaking to characterize this relationship formally, and analyze the model for the case of three competing interest groups. We find that an interest group's expected power is maximized when its members are evently divided across (m+1)/2 of the m districts, except when the group is somewhat small, in which case its expected power is maximized when it is evenly divided across all m districts. Expected power decreases sharply as a group's members become concentrated in fewer than (m+1)/2 districts.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Becker GS (1983) A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Q J Econ 98:371–400
Chappell HW (1981) Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill: a comparison of simultaneous models. Public Choice 36:301–312
Chappell HW (1982) Campaign contributions and congressional voting: a simultaneous probit-tobit model. Rev Econ Stat 62:77–83
Gardner BL (1987) Causes of U.S. farm commodity programs. J Pol Econ 95:290–310
Hrebenar RJ, Scott RK (1982) Interest group politics in america. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
Johnston RJ (1977) Population distributions and electoral power: preliminary investigations of class bias. Reg Stud 11:309–321
Johnston RJ (1982) Political geography and political power. In: Holler MJ (ed) Power, voting and voting power. Physica, Heidelberg Wien
Kau JB, Rubin PH (1982) Congressmen, constituents, and contributers. Mamrtinus Nijhoff, Boston 1982
Lavergne RP (1983) The political economy of U.S. tariffs. Academic Press, New York 1983
Miller TC (1986) Explaining differences in agricultural price policy across countries and across commodities using a model of competition between pressure groups. (Mimeo) July
Peltzman S (1976) Towards a more general theory of regulation. J Law Econ 18:745–771
Pincus J (1977) Pressure groups and politics in Antebellum tariffs. Columbia University Press, New York
Ray EJ (1981) The determinants of tariff and nontariff trade restrictions in the United States. J Pol Econ 89:105–121
Silberman JI, Durden GC (1976) Determining legislative preferences on the minimum wage: an economic approach. J Pol Econ 84:317–329
Spilerman S, Dickens D (1974) Who will gain and who will lose influence under different election rules. Am J Soc 80:443–477
Stigler G (1971) The economic theory of regulation. Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21
Taylor PJ, Johnston RJ (1979) Geography of elections. Holmes and Meier, New York
Weinberger M, Greevey DU (eds) (1982) The PAC directory. Ballinger, Cambridge
Welch WP (1982) Campaign contributions and legislative voting: milk money and dairy price supports. West Pol Q 35:478–495
Wright JR (1985) PAC's, contributions, and roll calls: an organizational perspective. Am Pol Sci Rev 79:400–414
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
The author would like to thank the participants of the Workshop in Applications of Economics at the University of chicago fpr their helpful comments, and the Center for the Study of the Economy and the State for its financial support.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Snyder, J. Political geography and interest-group power. Soc Choice Welfare 6, 103–125 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303166
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303166