Abstract
In this essay, I distinguish two significant act-utilitarian theories of moral education: the traditional rule of thumb view and the Harian intuition view. I argue that there are problems with the traditional view and that an act-utilitarian ought to adopt a version of the Harian view. I then explain and respond to a major objection to the intuition view given by Bernard Williams. Williams argues that the system of moral thought which the Harian view advocates we teach is inherently unstable and is certain to undermine itself. I argue that there is reason to expect a great deal of stability in this system.
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References
Brandt, R.: 1984, ‘Utilitarianism and Moral Rights’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy XIV(1), 1–19.
Hare, R.M.: 1981, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Kohlberg, L.: 1969, ‘Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization’, in D.A. Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialization in Theory and Research, Rand McNally, New York, pp. 347–480.
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I wish to thank Richard Brandt, William Frankena and R.M. Hare for their conversation on this and other topics and for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the Association for the Philosophy of Education and the Northwest Philosophy conference for the opportunity to read and discuss versions of the essay.
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Levy, S.S. Moral education: An act-utilitarian view1. Stud Philos Educ 10, 165–174 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372682
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372682