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Strategic voting in repeated referenda

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Abstract

This paper analyzes learning and voting strategy when a budget maximizing bureaucrat has several chances to obtain referendum approval. The process is modeled as a sequential game with a continuum of heterogeneous voters and a dominant bureaucrat in which all agents are uncertain about the true distribution of voter preferences. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayes Nash, so voting is strategic in the sense of foresighted but nevertheless noncooperative.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Accounting, The Pennsylvania State University, College of Business Administration, 16802, University Park, PA, USA

    S. Morton

  2. MIS, The Pennsylvania State University, College of Business Administration, 16802, University Park, PA, USA

    S. Morton

Authors
  1. S. Morton
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Additional information

Thanks to R. Gretlein, J. Hamilton, T. Palfrey, T. Romer, H. Rosenthal, S. Slutsky and the referees of this journal for their comments and encouragement. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions.

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Morton, S. Strategic voting in repeated referenda. Soc Choice Welfare 5, 45–68 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435497

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435497

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