Conclusion
If, to return to the image with which I started this paper we consider the path of papers written on the logical paradoxes, then there is much to be learnt from the more recent additions, those by Chihara, Dowden and Woodruff included. However, the case for the paraconsistent approach to the paradoxes has not been weakened. In fact, it seems to me to have been strengthened. If we consider the path of papers, not as a signle line, but branching according to the approach to the paradoxes advocated, then the “Logic of Paradox” would, I still submit, be on the right track.
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Priest, G. Logic of paradox revisited. J Philos Logic 13, 153–179 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00453020
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00453020