Abstract
This paper lays the groundwork for normative-yet-naturalistic social epistemology. I start by presenting two scenarios for the history of epistemology since Kant, one in which social epistemology is the natural outcome and the other in which it represents a not entirely satisfactory break with classical theories of knowledge. Next I argue that the current trend toward “naturalizing” epistemology threatens to destroy the distinctiveness of the sociological approach by presuming that it complements standard psychological and historical approaches. I then try to reassert, in Comtean fashion, the epistemologist's credentials in regulating knowledge production. Finally, I consider how social epistemology may have something exciting and relevant to say about contemporary debates in the theory of knowledge.
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A version of this paper appears as chapter one of Fuller (1988). My warmest thanks goes to Fred Schmitt, who saved me from many unclarities and howlers, as well as provided many probing remarks and criticisms with which I have barely begun to grapple.
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Fuller, S. On regulating what is known: A way to social epistemology. Synthese 73, 145–183 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485445
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485445