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On the relative leadership property of Stackelberg strategies

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Abstract

The relative leadership property of Stackelberg strategies has been investigated via a scalar nonzero-sum, two-person differential game problem. It is shown that, depending on the parameters of the game, there exist three different types of solutions for his class of games.

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References

  1. Simaan, M., andCruz, J. B., Jr.,On the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 5, 1973.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Engineering and Applied Physics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

    T. Basar (Research Fellow)

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  1. T. Basar
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Communicated by Y. C. Ho

This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. GK-31511, and the U.S. Office of Naval Research under the Joint Services Electronics Program, Contract No. N00014-67-A-0298-0006. The author would like to thank Professor Y. C. Ho for several valuable discussions.

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Basar, T. On the relative leadership property of Stackelberg strategies. J Optim Theory Appl 11, 655–661 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935564

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935564

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