Abstract
I argue that §§15–20 of the B-Deduction contain two independent arguments for the applicability of a priori concepts, the first an argument from above, the second an argument from below. The core of the first argument is §16's explanation of our consciousness of subject-identity across self-attributions, while the focus of the second is §18's account of universality and necessity in our experience. I conclude that the B-Deduction comprises powerful strategies for establishing its intended conclusion, and that some assistance from empirical psychology might well have produced a completely successful argument.
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References
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Pereboom, D. Self-understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Synthese 103, 1–42 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063717
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063717