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Derivability of admissible rules

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Literature cited

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  1. G. E. Mints
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Translated from Zapiski Nauchnykh Seminarov Leningradskogo Otdeleniya Matematicheskogo Instituta im. V. A. Steklova Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 32, pp. 85–89, 1972.

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Mints, G.E. Derivability of admissible rules. J Math Sci 6, 417–421 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01084082

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