Abstract
The equivalence of anonymous direct mechanisms and tax systems for continuum economies, which has been demonstrated by Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1981), is shown to have its counterparts in large finite economies.
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We are deeply indebted to Roger Guesnerie for stimulating our interest in this problem and for the inspiration gained through his work.
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Dierker, E., Haller, H. Tax systems and direct mechanisms in large finite economies. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 52, 99–116 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227553
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227553