Skip to main content
Log in

Computability, complexity and economics

  • Published:
Computational Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Herbert Simon advocates that economists should study procedureal rationality instead of substantive rationality. One approach for studying procedural rationality is to consider algorithmic representations of procedures, which can then be studied using the concepts of computability and complexity. For some time, game theorists have considered the issue of computability and have employed automata to study bounded rationality. Outside game theory very little research has been performed. Very simple examples of the traditional economic optimization models can require transfinite computations. The impact of procedural rationality on economics depends on the computational resources available to economic agents.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Abreu, D. and Rubinstein, A., 1988, The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata,Econometrica 56, No. 6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aho, A.V., Hopcroft, J.E., and Ullman, J.D., 1974,The design and analysis of computer algorithms (Addison-Wesley: Reading).

    Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.J., 1981, Survey of repeated games, inEssays in Game theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, (Bibiographische Institut: Mannheim).

    Google Scholar 

  • Banks, J.S. and Sundaram, R.K., 1990, Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity,Games and Economic Behavior, vol 2, pp 97–119

    Google Scholar 

  • Beja, A., 1989, Finite and infinite complexity in axioms of rational choiceor Sen's characterization of preference-compatibility cannot be improved,Journal of Economic Theory 49, 339–346.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ben-Porath, E., 1986, Repeated games with finite automata, IMSSS, Stanford University (manuscript).

  • Ben-Porath, E. and Peleg, B., 1987, On the Folk theorem and finite automata, The Hebrew University (discussion paper).

  • Ben-Porath, E., 1990, The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies,Games and Economic Behavior 2, 1–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Binmore, K., 1990,Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford).

    Google Scholar 

  • Blum, M., 1967, A machine independent theory of the complexity of recursive functions,J. ACM 14, 3322–3336.

    Google Scholar 

  • Canning, D., 1992, Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium,Econometrica 60, 877–888.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chow, Chee-Seng and Tsitsiklis, John N. 1989, The Complexity of Dynamic Programming,Journal of Complexity 5, 466–488.

    Google Scholar 

  • Easley, David and Keifer, N.M. 1988, Controlling a stochastic process with unknown parameters,Econometrica 56, 1045–1064.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, J.P., 1982, Some Undecidable Determined Games,International Journal of Game Theory II, 63–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilboa, Itzhak, 1988, The complexity of computing best-response automata in repeated games,Journal of Economic Theory 45, 342–352.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartmanis, Juris, 1989, Overview of Computational Complexity. Theory in Hartmanis, J. (ed.),Computational Complexity Theory (American Mathematical Society: Providence).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalai, E., 1990, Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games, in Ichiishi, T., Neyman, A. and Tuaman, Y. (eds.),Game Theory and Applications, (Academic Publishers, San Diego).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalai, E. and Stanford, W. 1988, Finite rationality and interpersonal complexity in repeated games,Econometrica 56, 2, 397–410.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lipman, B.L. and Srivastava, S. 1990, Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games,Games and Economic Behavior 2, 273–290

    Google Scholar 

  • Lipman, B.L., 1991, How to decide how to decide how to ...: Modeling limited rationality,Econometrica 59, 1105–1125.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matijasevis, J.V., 1971, On recursive unsolvability of Hilbert's tenth problem, Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Bucharest, Amsterdam 1973, pp 89–110.

  • Neyman, A., 1985, Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma,Economics Letters, Vol 19, pp 227–229.

    Google Scholar 

  • Norman, A., 1981, On the control of structural models,Journal of Econometrics 15, 13.24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Norman, Alfred L., 1987, A Theory of Monetary Exchange,Review of Economic Studies 54, 499–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • Norman, Alfred L., 1992, On the complexity of consumer choice, Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin, (manuscript) Presented at the 1992 Society of Economics and Control Summer Conference, Montreal.

  • Norman, Alfred L., 1993, On the Complexity of Linear Quadratic Control,European Journal of Operations Research 73, 1–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Norman, Alfred L., 1994a Risk, Uncertainty and Complexity,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 18, 231–249.

    Google Scholar 

  • Norman, Alfred L. and Jung, Woo S. 1977, Linear Quadratic Control Theory For Models With Long Lags,Econometrica 45, 905–917.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostroy, J. and Starr, R., 1974, Money and the Decentralization of Exchange,Econometrica 42, 1093–1113.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papadmimitriou, C.H., 1992, On players with a bounded number of states,Games and Economic Behavior 4, 122–131.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papadminitriou, C.H. and Steiglitz, K., 1982,Combinatorial Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity, (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs).

    Google Scholar 

  • Prasad, K. and Kelly J.S., 1990, NP-Completeness of some problems concerning voting games,International Journal of Game Theory 19, 1–9.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rabin, M.O., 1957, Effective computability of winning strategies, M. Dresheret al. (eds),Contributions to the Theory of Games, Annals of Mathematical Studies39, 147–157.

  • Rubinstein, A., 1986, Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma,Journal of Economic Theory 39, 83–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rustem, B. and Velupillai, K., 1987, Objective Functions and the complexity of policy design,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 11, 185–192.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rustem, B. and Velupillai, K., 1990, Rationality, computability, and complexity,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 14, 419–432.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H.A., 1976, Form substantive to procedural rationality, S. Latsis (ed.),Method and Appraisal in Economics, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).

    Google Scholar 

  • Sommerhalder, R. and van Westrhenen, S. 1988The theory of Computability: Programs, Machines, Effectiveness and Feasibility, (Addison Wesley: Workingham).

    Google Scholar 

  • Spear, S.E., 1989a, When are small frictions negligible? in Barnett, W., J. Geweke, and K. Shell (eds.),Economic complexity: Chaos, sunspots, subbles, and nonlinearity, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).

    Google Scholar 

  • Spear, S.E., 1989, Learning Rational Expectations under computability constraints,Econometrica 57, 889–910.

    Google Scholar 

  • Traub, J.F., Wasilkowski, G.W. and Woźniakowski, H., 1988,Information Based Complexity, (Academic Press, Inc., Boston).

    Google Scholar 

  • Zemel, E., 1985, Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality,Journal of Economic Theory, vol 49, No. 1, pp 1–9.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Norman, A.L. Computability, complexity and economics. Comput Econ 7, 1–21 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01299326

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01299326

Keywords

Navigation