Abstract
We study Stackelberg games with incomplete information in a general setting. In particular, we deduce the follower's reaction function, a set-valued function of the leader's action choice and a parameter specifying the follower's payoff type (a parameter about which the leader has only incomplete information), and using a generalized version of Komlos' Theorem due to Balder (1987), we show the existence of an expected payoff maximizing, incentive compatible strategy for the leader given the follower's reaction function.
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I would like to thank an anonymous referee and Erik Balder for helpful comments.
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Page, F.H. Incentive compatible strategies for general stackelberg games with incomplete information. Int J Game Theory 18, 409–421 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01358801
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01358801