Skip to main content
Log in

A generalized linear production model: A unifying model

  • Published:
Mathematical Programming Submit manuscript

Abstract

We introduce a generalized linear production model whose attractive feature being that the resources held by any subset of producersS is not restricted to be the vector sum of the resources held by the members ofS. We provide sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of the associated generalized linear production game, and show that if the core of the game is not empty then a solution in it can be produced from a dual optimal solution to the associated linear programming problem. Our generalized linear production model is a proper generalization of the linear production model introduced by Owen, and it can be used to analyze cooperative games which cannot be studied in the ordinary linear production model framework. We use the generalized model to show that the cooperative game induced by a network optimization problem in which players are the nodes of the network has a non-empty core. We further employ our model to prove the non-emptiness of the core of two other classes of cooperative games, which were not previously studied in the literature, and we also use our generalized model to provide an alternative proof for the non-emptiness of the core of the class of minimum cost spanning tree games. Thus, it appears that the generalized linear production model is a unifying model which can be used to explain the non-emptiness of the core of cooperative games generated by various, seemingly different, optimization models.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. L.J. Billera and R.E. Bixby, “Market representation ofn-person games“,Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 80 (1974) 522–526.

    Google Scholar 

  2. C. Bird, “On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach“,Networks 6 (1976) 335–350.

    Google Scholar 

  3. O.N. Bondareva, “Some applications of linear programming methods to the theory of cooperative games“, (in Russian)Problemy Kibernetiki 10 (1963) 119–139.

    Google Scholar 

  4. A. Charnes and K.O. Kortanek, “On balanced sets, cores and linear programming“,Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes de Recherches Opérationnelles 9 (1967) 32–43.

    Google Scholar 

  5. P. Dubey and L.S. Shapley, “Totally balanced games arising from controlled programming problems“,Mathematical Programming 29 (1984) 245–267.

    Google Scholar 

  6. J. Edmonds, “Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1 vertices“,National Bureau of Standards Journal of Research 69B (1965) 125–130.

    Google Scholar 

  7. J. Edmonds, “Optimum branchings“,National Bureau of Standards Journal of Research 71B (1967) 233–240.

    Google Scholar 

  8. D. Gale and L.S. Shapley, “College admissions and the stability of marriage“,American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1962) 9–14.

    Google Scholar 

  9. R.E. Gomory and T.C. Hu, “An application of generalized linear programming to network flows“,Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics 10 (1962) 260–283.

    Google Scholar 

  10. D. Granot, “A note on the room-mates problem and a related revenue allocation problem“,Management Science 30 (1984) 633–643.

    Google Scholar 

  11. D. Granot and G. Huberman, “Minimum cost spanning tree games“,Mathematical Programming 21 (1981) 1–18.

    Google Scholar 

  12. D. Granot and G. Huberman, “On the core and nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games“,Mathematical Programming 29 (1984) 323–347.

    Google Scholar 

  13. D. Granot and F. Granot, “On some network flow games”, Working Paper No. 1056, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, Vancouver (1984).

    Google Scholar 

  14. E. Kalai and E. Zemel, “Generalized network problems yielding totally balanced games“,Operations Research 30 (1982) 998–1008.

    Google Scholar 

  15. G. Owen, “On the core of linear production games“,Mathematical Programming 9 (1975) 358–370.

    Google Scholar 

  16. L.S. Shaplley, “On balanced sets and cores“,Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 4 (1967) 453–460.

    Google Scholar 

  17. L.S. Shapley and M. Shubik, “The assignment game I: The core“,International Journal of Game Theory 1 (1972) 111–130.

    Google Scholar 

  18. M.J. Todd, Private Communication, June 1985.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Dedicated to George B. Dantzig.

This research was partially done while the author was visiting the Graduate School of Business Administration at Tel-Aviv University. The research was partially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Canada Grant A4181 and by SSHRC leave fellowship 451-83-0030.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Granot, D. A generalized linear production model: A unifying model. Mathematical Programming 34, 212–222 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580585

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580585

Key words

Navigation