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Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review

  • Section IV Group Decision Making Through Voting
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Abstract

The most important power indices are presented. The effectiveness of these indicators is discussed with reference to description of political and financial events. Some recent studies and applications are shown.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Informatics and Applications, University of Bergamo, Piazza Rosate 2, I-24100, Bergamo, Italy

    Gianfranco Gambarelli

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  1. Gianfranco Gambarelli
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Gambarelli, G. Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review. Ann Oper Res 51, 163–173 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02032761

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