Summary
We provide axiomatic foundations to model imprecision in a subject’s preferences and beliefs through a set of probability distributions and a set of utility functions, in the simple case.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Anscombe, F., Aumann, R. (1963). A definition of subjective probability.Ann. Math. Statist. 34, 199–205.
DeGroot, M. H. (1970).Optimal Statistical Decisions. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Fishburn, P. C. (1982).The Foundations of Expected Utility. D. Reidel.
Fisburn, P. C. (1990).Nonlinear Expected Utility. Lexington.
Girón, F. J. and Rios, S. (1980). Quasi Bayesian behaviour: A more realistic approach to decision making?Bayesian Statistics (J. M. Bernardo, M. H. DeGroot, D. V. Lindley and A. F. M. Smith, eds.), Valencia, University Press.
Pryce, J. D. (1973).Basic Methods of Linear Functional Analysis. Hutchinson.
Rios-Insua, D. (1990)Sensitivity Analysis in Multi-objective Decision Making, New York: Springer.
Rios-Insua, D. (1992). On the foundations of decision making under partial information.Theory and Decision 33, 83–100.
Savage, L. J. (1954).The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rios-Insua, D. Foundations for a robust theory of decision making: the simple case. Test 1, 69–78 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02562663
Received:
Revised:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02562663