Abstract
In this paper we present some new results concerning the least square family of values for TU games. We first examine the stability of these values from a dynamic point of view and propose a reinteropretation of them from the standpoint of the propernsity to disrupt approach. In the second part the family of individually rational least square (IRLS) values is introduced and an alternative kernel-like formulation of them is provided. Finally we describe a natural and simple algorithm for calculating any IRLS value of a game.
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We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Basque Government (Project PI95/101) and from the D.G.E.S. of the Ministerio de Educatión y Cultura (Project PB96-0247).