This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Cf. Nicholas Wolterstorff's important paper ‘God Everlasting’,Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 77–98.
Such would seem to constitute the major theme of Nelson Pike's influential studyGod and Timelessness (New York: Schocken Books, 1970).
For example, the ‘hurdle’ in question may not constitute a serious difficulty— or, for that matter, any genuine difficulty at all—forprocess theists.
Richard Taylor,Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 72.
Many would contend that on a Newtonian or ‘absolutistic’ conception of Time (and Space), Time (and Space) constitute substances. Cf., for example, Paul Horwish's interesting essay ‘On the Existence of Time, Space, and Space-Time’,Nous, vol. X11, (1978), pp. 397–419.
Hawking's excellent and lucid bookA Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam Books, 1988).
The parenthetical qualifier ‘concrete’ is important here. For if some version of Platonic realism is true, there could not exist a concrete object that failed to require the existence of something distinct from itself in order to exist, i.e., that failed to require the existence of theabstract object that constituted its ‘form’. Hence, not even the concretum Who isGod could exist without there existing the form (or, as we tend to put itthese days, ‘the property’)Divinity. Accordingly, ‘concrete’ has been inserted in order to ensure the compatibility of Platonism with thea se existence of some concretum-presumably, of course,God-i.e., to avert the intuitively unsavoury conclusion that thea se existence of God entails the falsity of (all versions of) Platonism. Hence, God possesses aseity so long as there is noconcrete existent (distinct from God) the existence of which constitutes an ontological requirement for God's existence.
And thus, of course, with both. Since the negation of (2) is a transparenta fortiori entailment of the negation of (1), it cannot be the case thatET is incompatible withjust the first of these doctrines. Since it is clear, however, that theconverse does not hold-clear that the negation of (1) is not entailed by the negation of (2)-it clearlycould be the case thatET is incompatible withjust the second of these doctrines. We will see that, while a modified account of aseity allows for the compatibility ofET with (1)-and thus rescueET from incompatibility with (1)and (2)-the situation concerning the compatibility ofET with (2) is considerably more stubborn.
I borrow this expression from Thomas Morris. Cf. his illuminating bookAnselmian Explorations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).
It is intriguing to speculate on the distinction between existinga se andexisting-at-all-possible-worlds. These are often thought to be interchangeable notions (or conceptually equivalent properties); it is less than entirely clear that such is the case. For example, on ourinitial construal of aseity, it is readily seen that aseity is astronger property than existing-at-all-possible worlds. For given the conjunction of Anselmian theism withET, God would exist at all possible worlds but lack aseity (since the existence of Time constitutes an ontological requirement for the existence of God). On themodified conception of aseity (which we have taken for present purposes tosupersede the initial account), however, the relevant notions might well be interchangeable, depending upon whetheruncreatedness is (as I believe, but with something shy ofmaximum confidence) not a property that can be had at one possible world but lacked at another (by, of course, the same individual).
An example of aless-than-respectable argument for this thesis is offered by Martin Gardner in his review of Stephen Hawking's recent bookA Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes. Gardner claims. ‘I can imagine a possible world without time-just think of the universe as frozen to a halt-but I cannot conceive of you and me ‘existing’ in such a world’ (The New York Review of Books, June 16, 1988, p.20). It seems to me that this constitutes yet further confirmation of the unrealiability of arguments which begin with ‘I can imagine’ (or ‘I can conceive’). Even if onecan imagine a universe that ‘freezes to a halt’, it is hard to see how the relevant possible world is one which fails to include the existence of Time. For if everythingcomes frozen to a halt, some (dramatic if not catastrophic)physical event has occurred. Surely, however, physical events cannot occur atemporally.
A thesis that has the endorsement of eminent physicists as well as eminent philosophers. In his excellent and imaginative paper ‘The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God’ (inDivine and Human Action, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 211–235), Peter van Inwagen reminds us of that in the course of lending his support to this view of the relation between Time and the physical world: ‘If there had been no world, there would have been no such thing as time, and one can make no sense of talk of temporal relations except in reference to the physical world. As both St. Augustine and Stephen Hawking have insisted, it makes no sense to ask what happenedbefore-at least in the literal, temporal sense of the word-the world existed. (Hawking employs this analogy: You might as well ask what is happening north of the North Pole.’) (Cf.p.219, under note #5).
Even if one is prepared to deny that Time is strictly afunction of the physical world, the view that Time constitutesa divine creation clearly carries the weight of tradition. According to Maimonides, who, incidentally,did hold that Time is strictly a function of the physical world, i.e., that ‘time is consequent upon motion and motion is an accident in what is moved’ (The Guide of the Perplexed, II 13), God ‘brought into existence out of nothing all the beings as they are, time itself being one of the created things’ (loc. cit.). Aquinas states the following: ‘For four things are stated to be created together-viz., the empyrean heavens, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature’ (Summa Theologica, 1, Q.46, Art. 3).
Here we have a paradigmatic illustration of the point that there are theological doctrines (the case in point beingthat God fails to have Time as one of His aspects) such that it is notobvious whether they constitute components of the nonnegotiable core of orthodox theism. Of course, this hardly implies anything so foolish as that orthodox theism does nothave a nonnegotiable core, or that there are not many doctrines that canincontestably be identified as components of that core, e.g. that God is (the only Being) worthy of worship, is eternal, is almighty, is omniscient, existsa se, is theexclusive possessor of aseity among concreta, etc. How these doctrines are to beexplicated is, of course, often controversial. Needless to say that the disagreement over how to understand God's eternality is but one of many disputes concerning the proper explication of those doctrines thatClearly constitute core components of canonical theistic metaphysics.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Oakes, R. Temporality and divinity: An analytic hurdle. SOPH 31, 11–26 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02772349
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02772349