Summary.
We consider a model of social choice dealing with the problem of choosing a subset from a set of objects (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems). Agents have trichotomous preferences for which objects are partitioned into three indifference classes, goods, bads, and nulls, or dichotomous preferences for which each object is either a good or a bad. We characterize plurality-like social choice rules on the basis of the three main axioms, known as Pareto efficiency, anonymity, and independence.
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Received: 29 August 2003, Revised: 3 June 2004,
JEL Classification Numbers:
D70, D71, D72.
Biung-Ghi Ju: I am grateful to William Thomson and Jianbo Zhang for their helpful comments and discussions. I also thank Brandon Dupont, the participants in seminars at Iowa State University, University of Kansas, and the Midwest Theory Meeting at University of Notre Dame. I thank an anonymous referee for detailed comments and suggestions that were very helpful in simplifying the proof of Theorem 1 and in revising the paper.
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Ju, BG. An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains. Economic Theory 26, 115–128 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0533-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0533-1