Skip to main content
Log in

Rationalizability in large games

  • Research Article
  • Published:
Economic Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper characterizes both point-rationalizability and rationalizability in large games when societal responses are formulated as distributions or averages of individual actions. The sets of point-rationalizable and rationalizable societal responses are defined and shown to be convex, compact and equivalent to those outcomes that survive iterative elimination of never best responses, under point-beliefs and probabilistic beliefs, respectively. Given the introspection and mentalizing that rationalizability notions presuppose, one motivation behind the work is to examine their viability in situations where the terms rationality and full information can be given a more parsimonious, and thereby a more analytically viable, expression.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In the sequel, “societal response” is used interchangeably with “statistical summary,” and “agent” with “player.”

  2. See the survey and the references in Khan and Sun (2002).

  3. It is less known, but common knowledge of (or common belief in) rationality has already been studied in Böge and Eisele (1979). Their contribution is well explained in Section 7 of Perea (2013).

  4. Aumann (1976) offers a formal definition of common knowledge.

  5. This process is exactly the one used by Pearce (1984) to define rationalizability. But Pearce (1984) uses mixed strategies to eliminate the never best responses.

  6. See, for example, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), Dekel et al. (2007), Chen and Luo (2012) and their references.

  7. See, for example, Banks and Duggan (2006).

  8. See, for example, Guesnerie (1992). There are some other rational expectations models, see the discussion in Khan (2008, p. 76).

  9. See, for example, Rauh (1997, 2003).

  10. One can refer to Hildenbrand (1974) for the theory of correspondences in the finite-dimensional setting.

  11. A probability space \((I,\mathcal I ,\lambda )\) is atomless if for any \(S \in \mathcal{I }\) with \(\lambda (S)>0\), there exists a \(S^{\prime }\in \mathcal{I }\), such that \(S^{\prime }\subseteq S\) and \(0<\lambda (S^{\prime }) < \lambda (S)\).

  12. It is standard to forgo referring to this as the narrow topology, the topology of convergence in distribution, or the weak\(^*\)-topology, the formally correct designation. Throughout this paper, for any metrizable topological space \(X,\,\mathcal M (X)\) is used to denote the space of probability measures on \(X\) endowed with this weak topology. It is known that if \(X\) is a compact metric space, the space \(\mathcal{M }(X)\) is also a compact metric space.

  13. There are different terminologies related to the various equivalent definitions of a saturated probability space: it is called “\(\aleph _1\)-atomless” and “a probability space to have the saturation property” in Hoover and Keisler (1984), “nowhere separable” in Džamonja and Kunen (1995), “a probability space with a set of uncountable cardinals as its Maharam spectrum” in Fajardo and Keisler (2002),“super-atomless” in Podczeck (2008), “nowhere countably generated” in Loeb and Sun (2009) and “rich” in Noguchi (2009).

  14. See Podczeck (2008, Fact) for example.

  15. See, for example, Kakutani (1944), Podczeck (2008) and Sun and Zhang (2009).

  16. This result is summarized from (Khan and Sun (1995), Theorem 10), (Keisler and Sun (2009), Theorem 4.6), (Carmona and Podczeck (2009), Theorem 2) and (Noguchi (2009), Theorem 2). Throughout the paper, results previously available in the literature are called “Propositions.”

  17. A correspondence \(F\) from a set \(X\) to \(Y\) is a relation which assigns to each \(x\in X\) a subset \(F(x)\) of \(Y\). \(F: X\twoheadrightarrow Y\) is used to distinguish a correspondence from a function from \(X\) to \(Y\). One can refer to Aliprantis and Border (2006, Chapters 17 and 18) for standard notions and results on correspondences. For sake of reference, a brief summary of results on correspondences that are used in this paper is provided in Appendix A.

  18. Proofs of all lemmas are provided in Appendix B.

  19. Hence, \(B(\cdot ,\mathcal D )\) is also compact-valued since \(A\) is compact.

  20. This idea is referred to as an “eductive process” in Guesnerie (1992) and used to characterize a standard market with a continuum of producers.

  21. For any sequence \(\{x_t\}\) in a topological space, let \(cl\text{-Lim }\,\{x_t\}\) be the set of its limit points. For any sequence of sets \(\{A_t\}\) in a topology space, let \(cl\text{-Lim }\,\{A_t\}\) be the union of all such \(cl\text{-Lim }\,\{x_t\}\) with \(x_t \in A_t\) for all \(t\).

  22. Note that for any nonempty \(\mathcal D \subseteq \mathcal M (A),\,\mathcal{M }(\mathcal D ) = \left\{ \mu \in \mathcal M \left( \mathcal M (A)\right) : \text{ supp } \mu \subseteq \mathcal{D }\right\} \).

  23. The author thanks the referee for these references.

  24. The author is thankful to the referee for pointing this out.

  25. See Yu and Zhang (2007) for details of such a large game setting.

  26. Note that in Jara-Moroni (2012), the analysis for rationalizability is given for societal responses formulated as averages but with the action set being a compact subset of a finite-dimensional space.

  27. In fact, for a compact metric space \(X\), this separable Banach space is \(\mathcal{C }(X)\), the space of continuous real-valued functions on \(X\) with the sup-norm topology with its Borel \(\sigma \)-algebra \(\mathcal B (\mathcal C (X))\); see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Lemma 3.23 and Theorem 9.14) for example.

  28. Measure spaces of agents and infinite-dimensional Banach spaces are widely used in the economics literature; see Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) for the existence of Nash equilibria of atomless games with infinite-dimensional action spaces and for the existence of competitive equilibria in models with an atomless measure space of agents and an infinite-dimensional commodity space, where the algebraic dimension of \(L^\infty (E)\) is bigger than the algebraic dimension of the underlying strategy/commodity space for each non-null subset \(E\) of agents; also see Yannelis (2009) and Khan (2012) for recent developments.

  29. This is implied by the Krein-Smulian Theorem; see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 6.35).

  30. See, Rauh (1997), for example, where the context of monopolistic competitions is considered. It is assumed there that the players’ payoffs depend on their own action and the transformed summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profiles in terms of the moments of the distributions of players’ actions. The existence of Nash equilibria has been shown in Rauh (2003) and Yu and Zhu (2005) for such games where societal responses are formulated as transformed summary statistics.

  31. The model used to characterize rationalizability in Jara-Moroni (2012) is a special case of the model considered here. To cover the case considered in Jara-Moroni (2012), one can take \(A\) as a subset of \(\mathbb R ^{n}\) and \(s\) as the identity map.

  32. The author is thankful to the referee for this observation.

  33. See Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) for the discussion on correlated and independent rationalizability.

  34. See Sun (2006) and its references.

  35. Part (1) of Propositions 5 and 6 is shown in Khan and Sun (1996). Part (2) of Propositions 5 and 6 is shown for the case of atomless Loeb measures in Sun (1997). Based on some advanced functional analytic methods, Podczeck (2008) proves P2 and P3 in Part (2) of Propositions 5 and 6. As shown in Sun and Yannelis (2008)), Part (2) of Propositions 5 and 6 follows easily from the corresponding properties for integration in the case of Loeb spaces in Sun (1997) and for distribution in the case of saturated spaces in Keisler and Sun (2009).

References

  • Aliprantis, C.D., Border, K.C.: Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker’s Guide, 3rd edn. Springer, Berlin (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  • Angeletos, G.-M., Hellwig, C., Pavan, A.: Dynamic global games of regime change: learning, multiplicity and the timing of attacks. Econometrica 75, 711–756 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arieli, I.: Rationalizability in continuous games. J. Math. Econ. 46, 912–924 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.J.: Markets with a continuum of traders. Econometrica 32, 39–50 (1964)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.J.: Agreeing to disagree. Ann. Stat. 4, 1236–1239 (1976)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Banks, J.S., Duggan, J.: A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games. Soc. Choice Welf. 26, 285–304 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Basu, K., Weibull, J.W.: Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior. Econ. Lett. 36, 141–146 (1991)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Böge, W., Eisele, T.: On solutions of Bayesian games. Int. J. Game Theory 8, 193–215 (1979)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brandenburger, A., Dekel, E.: Rationalizability and correlated equilibria. Econometrica 55, 1391–1402 (1987)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernheim, B.D.: Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica 52, 1007–1028 (1984)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berge, C.: Topological Spaces. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London (1963)

    Google Scholar 

  • Carmona, G., Podczeck, K.: On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games. J. Econ. Theory 144, 1300–1319 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, Y.C., Luo, Xiao.: An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences. Econ. Theory 51, 1–12 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  • Dekel, E., Fudenberg, D., Morris, S.: Interim correlated rationalizability. Theor. Econ. 2, 15–40 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  • Džamonja, M., Kunen, K.: Properties of the class of measure separable compact spaces. Fundam. Math. 147, 261–277 (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, G.W., Guesnerie, R.: Coordination on saddle path solutions: the eductive viewpoint. 1—linear univariate models. Macroecon. Dyn. 7, 42–61 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fajardo, S., Keisler, H.J.: Model Theory of Stochastic Processes: Lecture Notes in Logic, vol. 14. Association for Symbolic Logic, Urbana (2002)

  • Hildenbrand, W.: Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1974)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoover, D.N., Keisler, H.J.: Adapted probability distributions. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 286, 159–201 (1984)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guesnerie, R.: An exploration on the eductive justification of the rational expectations hypothesis. Am. Econ. Rev. 82, 1254–1278 (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  • Guesnerie, R., Jara-Moroni, P.: Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Econ. Theory 47, 205–246 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jara-Moroni, P.: Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players. Games Econ. Behav. 75, 668–684 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jungbauer, T., Ritzberger, K.: Strategic games beyond expected utility. Econ. Theory 48, 377–398 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kakutani, S.: Construction of a non-separable extension of the Lebesgue measure space. Proc. Imp. Acad. 20, 115–119 (1944)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karni, E., Levin, D.: Social attributes and strategic equilibrium: a restaurant pricing game. J. Polit. Econ. 102, 822–840 (1994)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keisler, H.J., Sun, Y.N.: Why saturated probability spaces are necessary. Adv. Math. 221, 1584–1607 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khan, M.A.: Foresight, Perfect. In: Darity, W.A. (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edn., pp. 74–76. Macmillan Reference, Detroit (2008)

  • Khan, M.A.: La concorrenza perfetta come teoria dellequilibrio. In: Bartocci, C., Odifreddie, P. (eds.) La Matematica, vol. 4, pp. 875–947. Guilio Einaudi Editore, Rome (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  • Khan, M.A., Rath, K.P., Sun, Y.N.: On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players. J. Econ. Theory 76, 13–46 (1997)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khan, M.A., Sun, Y.N.: Pure strategies in games with private information. J. Math. Econ. 24, 633–653 (1995)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khan, M.A., Sun, Y.N.: Integrals of set-valued functions with a countable range. Math. Oper. Res. 21, 946–954 (1996)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khan, M.A., Sun, Y.N.: Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces. J. Math. Econ. 31, 455–492 (1999)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khan, M.A., Sun, Y.N.: Non-cooperative games with many players. In: Aumann, R.J., Hart, S. (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol. 3, pp. 1761–1808. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  • Loeb, P., Sun, Y.N.: Purification and saturation. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 137, 2719–2724 (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  • Noguchi, M.: Existence of Nash equilibria in large games. J. Math. Econ. 45, 168–184 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pearce, D.: Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica 52, 1029–1050 (1984)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perea, A.: From classical to epistemic game theory. Maastricht University, mimeo. http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/a.perea/Papers/FromClassToEpi.pdf (2013). Accessed 21 March 2013

  • Podczeck, K.: On the convexity and compactness of the integral of a Banach space valued correspondence. J. Math. Econ. 44, 836–852 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rath, K.P.: A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players. Econ. Theory 2, 427–433 (1992)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rauh, M.T.: A model of temporary search market equilibrium. J. Econ. Theory 77, 128–153 (1997)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rauh, M.T.: Non-cooperative games with a continuum of players whose payoffs depend on summary statistics. Econ. Theory 21, 901–906 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rustichini, A., Yannelis, N.C.: What is perfect competition. In: Khan, M.A., Yannelis, N.C. (eds.) Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. Springer, New York (1991)

    Google Scholar 

  • Sun, Y.N.: Integration of correspondences on Loeb spaces. Trans. Am. Math. Soc. 349, 129–153 (1997)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sun, Y.N.: The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks. J. Econ. Theory 126, 31–69 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sun, Y.N., Yannelis, N.C.: Saturation and the integration of Banach valued correspondences. J. Math. Econ. 44, 861–865 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sun, Y.N., Zhang, Y.: Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty. J. Econ. Theory 144, 432–443 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yannelis, N.C.: Integration of Banach-valued correspondences. In: Khan, M.A., Yannelis, N.C. (eds.) Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. Springer, New York (1991)

    Google Scholar 

  • Yannelis, N.C.: Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with symmetric information and a continuum of agents. Econ. Theory 38, 419–432 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yu, H., Zhang, Z.: Pure strategy equilibria in games with countable actions. J. Math. Econ. 43, 192–200 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yu, H., Zhu, W.: Large games with transformed summary statistics. Econ. Theory 26, 237–241 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Haomiao Yu.

Additional information

Part of this work constitutes Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins University. I am grateful to my advisors M. Ali Khan and Hülya Eraslan for their guidance and encouragement, and to Kali Rath for his helpful comments. This paper was presented at the 2012 NSF/NBER/CEME Conference in Mathematical Economics and General Equilibrium Theory held at Indiana University in Bloomington, and I would like to thank the participants for their constructive comments. The paper also owes a lot to a referee whose remarks and suggestions led to many improvements, and I am genuinely indebted to him/her. This research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SIG program) and Ryerson University.

Appendices

Appendix A

The first two propositions are on correspondences, whose details can be found in Aliprantis and Border (2006, Chapters 17 and 18).

Let \(S\) and \(X\) be topological spaces and \(F\) a correspondence from \(S\) to \(X\). \(F: S\twoheadrightarrow X\) has closed values or is closed-valued if \(F(s)\) is a closed set for each \(s\in S\). The terms compact-valued, convex-valued and nonempty-valued are similarly defined. Let \(F^{l}(E)\equiv \{s\in S: F(s)\bigcap E \ne \emptyset \}\) for any subset \(E\) of \(X\). If \(F^l(C)\) is closed for each closed subset \(C\) of \(Y,\,F: S\twoheadrightarrow X\) is upper hemicontinuous. \(F\) has closed graph is its graph \(\{(s, x)\in S\times Y: x\in F(s) \}\) is a closed subset of \(S\times X\).

Proposition 2

   \(P1\): A correspondence with compact Hausdorff range space has closed graph if and only if it is upper hemicontinuous and closed-valued.

\(P2\): The image of a compact set under a compact-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence is compact.

Let \((S, \Sigma )\) be a measurable space and \(X\) a topological space. A correspondence \(F: S\twoheadrightarrow X\) is said to be measurable, if for each closed subset \(C\) of \(X,\,F^{l}(C)\in {\Sigma }\), then \(F\) is said to be measurable; \(F\) is said to be weakly measurable, if for each open subset \(O\) of \(X\), \(F^{l}(O)\in {\Sigma }\). A function \(f\) is said to be a selection of \(F\) if \(f(s) \in F(s)\) for all \(s \in S\). With this notation, the next proposition is a collection of measurability results of correspondence and its selections.

Proposition 3

Let \((S, \Sigma )\) be a measurable space and \(X\) a Polish space. Let \(F,\,F_1,\,F_2\) be correspondences from \(S\) to \(X\).

\(P1\)::

If \(F\) has nonempty compact values, then \(F\) is measurable if and only if it is weakly measurable.

\(P2\) :

(Kuratowski–Ryll–Nardzewski Selection Theorem): If \(F\) is weakly measurable and has nonempty closed values, then it admits a measurable selection.

\(P3\)::

\(F\) has closed graph if and only if it is upper hemicontinuous and closed-valued.

\(P4\)::

If \(F_1\) and \(F_2\) are closed-valued and measurable, then their intersection correspondence \(G\), where \(G\) is such that for all \(s\in S,\,G(s)=F_1(s) \bigcap F_2(s)\), is measurable and closed-valued.

Let \(X\) be a Polish space and \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) an atomless probability space. A measurable function \(f: \Omega \rightarrow X\) is a measurable selection of a correspondence \(F: \Omega \twoheadrightarrow X\) if \(f(\omega )\in F(\omega )\) for \(P\)-almost all \(\omega \in \Omega \). The next proposition is culled from the corresponding results on the distribution of correspondences in Khan and Sun (1995) and Keisler and Sun (2009).

Proposition 4

Let \(X\) be a compact metric space and \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) an atomless probability space. Then the following results are valid if, in addition, (1) \(X\) is a countable, or (2) \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) is a saturated probability space.

\(P1\)::

Let \(\{f_n\}\) be a sequence of measurable functions from \(\Omega \) to X, such that \(\tau _n =P {f_n}^{-1}\) converges weakly to \(\tau \in \mathcal{M }(X)\) as \(n\rightarrow \infty \). Let \(D(\omega )=cl\text{-Lim }\,\{f_n(\omega )\}\). Then, \(D(\omega )\) is nonempty for almost all \(\omega \), and there exists a measurable selection \(f\) of \(D\), such that \(P f^{-1} = \tau \).

\(P2\)::

For any correspondence \(F\) from \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) to \(X,\,\mathcal D _F = \{Pf^{-1}:\,f\) is a measurable selection of \( F \}\) is convex.

\(P3\)::

For any compact-valued correspondence \(F\) from \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) to \(X,\,\mathcal D _F\) is compact.

The next two propositions are modified from Khan and Sun (1996), Sun (1997), Podczeck (2008) and Sun and Yannelis (2008). Proposition 5 is based on Bochner integral, whereas Proposition 6 is based on the Gel\(^\prime \)fand integral. See Yannelis (1991) and his references for an earlier treatment on the integration of correspondences over atomless probability spaces.

Let \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) be a finite measure space and \(X\) a Banach space. If \(f: \Omega \rightarrow X\) is a Bochner integrable function, \(\int _E f d P\) is the Bochner integral of \(f\) over \(E\) then for \(E\in \mathcal{F }\). If \(F: \Omega \twoheadrightarrow X\) is a correspondence, the Bochner integral of \(F\) is, denoted by \(\int _\Omega F d P\),

$$\begin{aligned} \displaystyle \int \limits _T F d P = \left\{ \int \limits _I f d P :f \text{ is } \text{ a } \text{ Bochner } \text{ integrable } \text{ selection } \text{ of } F\right\} . \end{aligned}$$

The next proposition deals with the Bochner integration of correspondences.

Proposition 5

Let \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) be an atomless probability space and \(X\) a separable Banach space. The following results are valid if, either (1) \(X\) is a countable or (2) \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) is a saturated probability space,

\(P1\)::

Let \(\{f_n\}\) be a sequence of measurable functions from \(\Omega \) to \(X\), such that \(\int {f_n} dP\) converges to \(\iota \) as \(n\rightarrow \infty \). Let \(D(\omega )=w\text{- }cl\text{-Lim }\,\{f_n(\omega )\}\). Then, \(D(\omega )\) is nonempty for almost all \(\omega \), and there exists a measurable selection \(f\) of \(D\) such that \(\int f d P = \iota \).

\(P2\)::

For any correspondence \(F\) from \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) into \(X,\,\int _\Omega F d P \) is convex.

\(P3\)::

For any integrably bounded, weakly compact-valued correspondence \(F\) from \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) to \(X,\,\int _\Omega F d P \) is weakly compact.

\(P4\)::

Let \(Y\) be a metric space and \(F\) a correspondence from \(\Omega \times Y\) to \(X\), such that for each fixed \(y\in Y,\,F(\cdot , y)\) is a measurable, weakly compact-valued correspondence from \(\Omega \) to \(X\). If \(F(\omega ,y)\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(Y\) for each fixed \(i\), then \(\int _\Omega F(\omega ,y) d P\) is weakly upper hemicontinuous on \(Y\).

Let \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) be an atomless probability space and \(X\) the dual of a separable Banach space. If \(f: \Omega \rightarrow X\) is a Gel\(^\prime \)fand integrable function, \(\int _E f d P\) is the Gel \(^\prime \) fand integral of \(f\) over \(E\) then for \(E\in \mathcal{F }\). If \(F: \Omega \twoheadrightarrow X\) is a correspondence, the Gel \(^\prime \) fand integral of \(F\) is, denoted by \(\int _\Omega F d P\),

$$\begin{aligned} \displaystyle \int \limits _T F d P = \left\{ \int \limits _I f d P :f \text{ is } \text{ a } \text{ Gel }^\prime \text{ fand } \text{ integrable } \text{ selection } \text{ of } F\right\} . \end{aligned}$$

The last proposition in this appendix is on the Gel\(^\prime \)fand integration of correspondences.

Proposition 6

Let \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) be an atomless probability space and \(X\) the dual of a separable Banach space. The following results are valid if, either (1) \(X\) is a countable or (2) \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) is a saturated probability space.

\(P1\)::

Let \(\{f_n\}\) be a sequence of measurable functions from \(\Omega \) to \(X\), such that \(\int {f_n} dP\) converges to \(\iota \) as \(n\rightarrow \infty \). Let \(D(\omega )=w^*\text{- }cl\text{-Lim }\,\{f_n(\omega )\}\). Then, \(D(\omega )\) is nonempty for almost all \(\omega \), and there exists a measurable selection \(f\) of \(D\), such that \(\int f d P = \iota \).

\(P2\)::

For any correspondence \(F\) from \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) into \(X,\,\int _\Omega F d P \) is convex.

\(P3\)::

For any integrably bounded, weak* compact-valued correspondence \(F\) from \((\Omega ,\mathcal A ,P)\) to \(X,\,\int _\Omega F d P \) is weak* compact.

\(P4\)::

Let \(Y\) be a metric space and \(F\) a correspondence from \(\Omega \times Y\) to \(X\), such that for any fixed \(y\in Y,\,F(\cdot , y)\) is a measurable, weak* compact-valued correspondence from \(\Omega \) to \(X\). If \(F(\omega ,y)\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(Y\) for each fixed \(i\), then \(\int _\Omega F(\omega ,y) d P\) is weakly upper hemicontinuous on \(Y\).Footnote 35

Appendix B

One can now prove the following lemma which is essential in the proof of Lemma 1.

Lemma 3

Let \(X,\,Y\) be two nonempty compact metric spaces. Let \(F\) be a measurable correspondence with nonempty closed values from an atomless probability space \((I,\mathcal I ,\lambda )\) to \(Y\), and for each \(i\in I\) consider a upper hemicontinuous and closed-valued correspondence \(M(i, \cdot ): Y \twoheadrightarrow X\). Let \(G: I\twoheadrightarrow Y \times X\) be such that \(G(i)\) is the graph of \(M(i, \cdot )\) for all \(i\in I\). If \(G\) is measurable, then the correspondence \(M(\cdot , F(\cdot )): I \twoheadrightarrow X\) is measurable and closed-valued.

Proof

Let \(\phi : I\twoheadrightarrow Y\times X\) be a correspondence, such that \(\phi (i)=F(i)\times X\) for all \(i\in I\). For any open set \(O\) of \(Y\times X\), consider \(\phi ^l(O)=\{i\in I: \phi (i) \bigcap O \ne \emptyset \}\). Let \(P_X\) and \(P_Y\) be the projection mappings from \(Y\times X\) to \(X\) and \(Y\), respectively. If \(P_X(O)\ne X,\,\phi ^l (O) = \emptyset \in \mathcal{I }\). If \(P_X(O) = X,\,\phi ^l(O)=\{i\in I: F(i) \bigcap P_Y(O) \ne \emptyset \}= F^l(P_Y(O))\in \mathcal{I }\) too, because \(F\) is measurable and \(P_Y\) is continuous. Thus, \(\phi \) is weakly measurable. By Proposition 3 (P1) in Appendix A, \(\phi \) is also measurable because by construction \(\phi \) has nonempty compact values. Let \(\phi ^G\) be such that \(\phi ^G (i)=\phi (i) \bigcap G(i)\) for all \(i\in I\). For any fixed \(i\in I\), since \(M(i, \cdot )\) is upper hemicontinuous and closed-valued, \(G(i)\) is closed by Proposition 3 (P3). Therefore, \(\phi ^G\) is closed-valued and measurable. Furthermore, note that by construction of \(\phi ^G,\,M(i, S(i))= P_X(\phi ^G(i))\) for all \(i\in I\). Therefore, the continuity of \(P_X\) implies that \(M(\cdot , S(\cdot )): I \twoheadrightarrow X\) is measurable and closed-valued. \(\square \)

One can prove Lemma 1 now.

Proof of Lemma 1

For any fixed nonempty closed set \(\mathcal D \) of \(\mathcal{M }(A)\), let \(\mathcal{D }(i)=\mathcal{D }\) for all \(i\in I\). It is clear that \(\mathcal D (\cdot )\) is a measurable and closed-valued correspondence. By Berge’s maximum theorem, for each \(i\in I\), the joint continuity of \(u_i\) on \(A\times \mathcal M (A)\) implies that \(B(i, \cdot )\) is upper hemicontinuous and has nonempty compact values on \(\mathcal M (A)\). Thus, by Lemma 3, in order to show that \(B(\cdot , \mathcal{D })\) is measurable and closed-valued, it suffices to show \(G: I \twoheadrightarrow \mathcal M (A) \times A\) is measurable where \(G(i)\) is the graph of \(B(i, \cdot )\) for all \(i\in I\).

Toward this end, for any given closed subset \(C\) of \(A \times \mathcal{M }(A)\), let \(U_C=\{f\in \mathcal U _A: \text{ there } \text{ exists } (a, \tau )\in C, \text{ such } \text{ that, } f(a, \tau ) \ge f(a^{\prime }, \tau ), \text{ for } \text{ all } a^{\prime } \in A\}.\) It is clear that \(\mathcal{G }^{-1}(U_C)=G^{l}(C)\) where \(G^l(C)=\{i\in I: C \cap G(i) \ne \emptyset \}\). Thus, given \(\mathcal{G }\) is measurable, it is sufficient to prove that \(U_C\) is closed. Let \(\{f^n\}\) be a sequence in \(U_C\) that converges uniformly to \(f^*\). As the uniform limit of a net of continuous real functions is still continuous (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 2.65)), \(f^*\in \mathcal U _A\). So, for any \(\varepsilon >0\), the continuity of \(f^*\) implies that for any convergent sequence \(\{(a^n, \tau ^n)\} \rightarrow (a^*, \tau ^*)\), there exists some \(N_1 \in \mathbb N \) such that for any \(n > N_1,\,|f^*(a^n, \tau ^n) - f^* (a^*, \tau ^*)| < \varepsilon /2\). The uniform convergence of \(g^n\) implies that there exists some \(N_2 \in \mathbb N \), such that for any \(n > N_2\), and for all \((a, \tau ) \in A \times \mathcal U _A,\,|f^n(a, \tau ) - f^* (a, \tau )| < \varepsilon /2\). Therefore, for any \(n > N\), where \(N=\max \{N_1, N_2\}\),

$$\begin{aligned} |f^n(a^n, \tau ^n) - f^* (a^*, \tau ^*)|&\le |f^n(a^n, \tau ^n) - f^*(a^n, \tau ^n)|\\&+ |f^*(a^n, \tau ^n) - f^* (a^*, \tau ^*)| <\varepsilon . \end{aligned}$$

Thus, \(f^n(a^n, \tau ^n) \rightarrow f^* (a^*, \tau ^*)\). I now show that there exists some element \((a, \tau )\) in \(C\) such that \(f^*(a, \tau ) \ge f^*(a^{\prime }, \tau ),\) for all \(a^{\prime } \in A\). For each \(n\in \mathbb N \), since \(f^n\in U_C\), there exists \((a^n, \tau ^n)\in C\), such that

$$\begin{aligned} f^n(a^n, \tau ^n) \ge f^n(a^{\prime }, \tau ^n),\quad \text{ for } \text{ all } a^{\prime } \in A. \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, the closeness of \(C\) implies that there is a subsequence of \((a^n, \tau ^n)\) that converges to some \((\hat{a}, \hat{\tau })\in C\). Without loss of generality, let the subsequence be the sequence itself. It is now clear that \((\hat{a}, \hat{\tau })\) satisfies \(f^*(\hat{a}, \hat{\tau }) \ge f^* (a^{\prime }, {\hat{\tau }})\) for any \(a^{\prime } \in A\). Hence, \(f^*\in U_C\). The proof is complete. \(\square \)

The next result is used in the proof of Theorem 3 to characterize expected payoffs under probabilistic beliefs. One can check that it holds, along the lines of the proof of Jara-Moroni (2012, Lemma 3.7).

Proposition 7

Let \(Y\) and \(X\) be compact metric spaces and \(u\) a continuous real-valued function on \(Y\times X\). Let \(U: Y\times \mathcal{M }(X)\) be a function such that for any \((y, \mu )\in Y\times \mathcal{M }(X)\),

$$\begin{aligned} U(y, \mu )=\int \limits _{X} u(y, x) d\mu . \end{aligned}$$

\(U\) is continuous on \(Y\times \mathcal{M }(X)\).

Proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 4 are as follows.

Proof of Lemma 2

Let \(\phi : \overline{con}\,(A) \twoheadrightarrow \overline{con}\,(A)\) be the Bochner integral correspondence such that for \(\iota \in \overline{con}\,(A),\,\phi (\iota )= \int _I B(i, \iota ) d\lambda \). By Berge’s maximum theorem and Proposition 2 (P2) in Appendix A, \(\phi \) has nonempty values. Then, together with the convexity and upper hemicontinuity results in Proposition 5 in Appendix A, one can appeal to the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium. \(\square \)

Proof of Theorem 4

First, note that one can show that for any closed subset \(X\subseteq \mathcal{A },\,B(\cdot , X)\) is measurable and has nonempty closed values by similar arguments in the proof of Lemma 1. Let \(\{F^t\}\) be a sequence of correspondences, such that \(F^t: I \twoheadrightarrow A, t \ge 0\) is given by

$$\begin{aligned} F^0(i)= A, \text{ for } \text{ all } i\in I\quad \text{ and }\quad F^t(i)= B\left( i, {Pr}^{t-1}(\mathcal{A })\right) , \text{ for } \text{ all } i\in I, \text{ if } t\ge 1, \end{aligned}$$

where \({Pr}^t(\mathcal{A }) = \int _I F^t d \lambda .\) Let \(F: I \twoheadrightarrow A\) be a correspondence, such that for all \(i\in I,\,F(i)= cl\text{-Lim }\,\{F^t(i)\}\). Then, one can now appeal to Proposition 5 (P1–P3) in Appendix A to complete the proof by arguments similar to proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3. \(\square \)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Yu, H. Rationalizability in large games. Econ Theory 55, 457–479 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0756-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0756-0

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation