Abstract
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. We characterize internally stable coalitions on the proposed domains and show how these characterizations can be used for generating a strict core element in the first case and a core element in the second case. Moreover, we prove that an element of the strict core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the core under enemies aversion is NP-hard.
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Dimitrov, D., Borm, P., Hendrickx, R. et al. Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games. Soc Choice Welfare 26, 421–433 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0104-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0104-4