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‘One and a Half Dimensional’ Preferences and Majority Rule

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Abstract

I examine a model of majority rule in which alternatives are described by two characteristics: (1) their position in a standard, left-right dimension, and (2) their position in a good-bad dimension, over which voters have identical preferences. I show that when voters’ preferences are single-peaked and concave over the first dimension, majority rule is transitive, and the majority’s preferences are identical to the median voter’s. Thus, Black’s (The theory of committees and elections, 1958) theorem extends to such a “one and a half” dimensional framework. Meanwhile, another well-known result of majority rule, Downs’ (An economic theory of democracy, 1957) electoral competition model, does not extend to the framework. The condition that preferences can be represented in a one-and-a-half-dimensional framework is strictly weaker than the condition that preferences be single-peaked and symmetric. The condition is strictly stronger than the condition that preferences be order-restricted, as defined by Rothstein (Soc Choice Welf 7:331–342;1990).

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  1. Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 90095, USA

    T. Groseclose

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Groseclose, T. ‘One and a Half Dimensional’ Preferences and Majority Rule. Soc Choice Welfare 28, 321–335 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0166-3

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