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Citizen candidates under uncertainty

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Abstract

In this paper I add uncertainty about the total vote count to a “citizen candidate” model of representative democracy. I show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. California Institute of Technology, HSS 228-77 Caltech, Pasadena, CA, 91125, USA

    Jon X. Eguia

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  1. Jon X. Eguia
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Correspondence to Jon X. Eguia.

Additional information

This work has benefited from valuable comments by Paul Healy, Morgan Kousser, Alejandro Saporiti, Al Slivinski, participants in a seminar in Princeton, and especially by Matt Jackson and Tom Palfrey. Their contribution is gratefully acknowledged.

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Eguia, J.X. Citizen candidates under uncertainty. Soc Choice Welfare 29, 317–331 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0207-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0207-y

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