Abstract
We consider industries where the equally skilled workers/members of firm-specific monopoly unions can be grouped according to different reservation wages. We show that, in absence of active antidiscrimination policy, discriminatory wage contracts across groups of employees may emerge, in equilibrium, under either oligopoly or a perfectly competitive product market. We subsequently propose that to combat wage discrimination a benevolent policy maker should under either market structure subsidize the employment of the low reservation wage group. The reason is that taxing wage discrimination, as an alternative antidiscrimination policy, always entails a welfare loss relative to the no policy/wage discrimination status quo.
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Vlassis, M., Drydakis, N. Wage discrimination and antidiscrimination policy in unionized industries. J Econ 105, 45–62 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0241-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0241-9