Abstract.
This paper characterizes the optimal insurance contract in an environment where an informed agent can misrepresent the state of the world to a principal who cannot credibly commit to an auditing strategy. Because the principal cannot commit, the optimal strategy of the agent is not to tell the truth all the time. Assuming that there are T > 1 possible losses, and that the agent cannot fake an accident (he is constrained only to misreport the size of the loss when a loss occurs), the optimal contract is such that higher losses are over-compensated while lower losses are on average under-compensated. The amount by which higher losses are over-compensated decreases as the loss increases. The optimal contract may then be represented as a simple combination of a deductible, a lump-sum payment and a coinsurance provision.
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Received: 29 January 1999, Accepted: 26 June 2001,
JEL Classification:
D82, G2, C72.
I would like to thank my dissertation committee Stanley Baiman, David Cummins, Georges Dionne, Neil Doherty and Sharon Tennyson (supervisor) for their insights, as well as Keith Crocker, Steve Coate, Richard Derrig, Michele Piccone and Pascale Viala. The financial help received during my doctoral studies from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the S. S. Huebner Foundation are gratefully acknowledged. This research has been funded by the Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et d'Aide à la Recherche (FCAR-Québec), SSHRC-Canada and the Risk Management Chair at HEC Montréal. The continuing financial support of CIRANO is also appreciated. I am responsible for all errors.
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Boyer, M.M. Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment. Review Economic Design 8, 1–38 (2003) (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0086-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0086-y