Abstract. We examine a bargaining game among players connected by a network, where successively potential partners negotiate over terms of a project. For any network structure and ordering of selection of bargaining partners, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome which coincides with the standard Rubinstein split. Based on this, we derive expected payoffs for players as a function of the network. We the characterize the pairwise stable and efficient bargaining networks. These two sets do not always coincide and in many situations pairwise stable networks are over-connected.
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Received: 10 April 2001 / Accepted: 17 January 2002
I am indebted to Matthew Jackson for suggesting this paper. I also thank Bernard Caillaud, Sanjeev Goyal, and the seminar participants at Universidad de Alicante, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, CEMFI (Madrid), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) and CERAS (Paris) for helpful comments. This paper was written while at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CERAS. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through research grant DGESIC PB96-0302, and from the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are of course mine.
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Calvó-Armengol, A. Stable and efficient bargaining networks. Rev Econ Design 7, 411–428 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200068
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200068