Abstract. In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
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Received: 25 December 1998 / Accepted: 8 April 2002
We are very grateful to William Thomson for many suggestions. Also we would like to thank comments from J. Alcalde, R. Bhattacharya, C. Herrero, P. Marhuenda, D. Pérez-Castrillo, A. Romero-Medina, T. Shinotsuka, T. Sjöström, and A. Villar, an associated editor and an anonymous referee. The first author thanks financial support from DGCYT and Direcció General de Reserca under projects PB98-0870, and SGR2000-00054. The second author wishes to acknowledge financial help from DGCYT under project PB98-0940.
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Beviá, C., Corchón, L. & Wilkie, S. Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games. Rev Econ Design 7, 429–442 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580300088
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580300088