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Corruption, institutions and regulation

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Abstract

We analyze the effects of corruption and institutional quality on the quality of business regulation. Our key findings indicate that corruption negatively affects the quality of regulation and that general institutional quality is insignificant once corruption is controlled for. These findings hold over a number of specifications which include additional exogenous historical and geographic controls. The findings imply that policy makers can focus on curbing corruption to improve regulation, over wider institutional reform.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland

    Michael Breen

  2. University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

    Robert Gillanders

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  1. Michael Breen
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  2. Robert Gillanders
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Correspondence to Michael Breen.

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Breen, M., Gillanders, R. Corruption, institutions and regulation. Econ Gov 13, 263–285 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-012-0111-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-012-0111-0

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