Abstract
Leading contemporary argumentation theories such as those of Ralph Johnson, van Eemeren and Houtlosser, and Tindale, in their attempt to address rhetoric, tend to define rhetorical argumentation with reference to (a) the rhetorical arguer’s goal (to persuade effectively), and (b) the means he employs to do so. However, a central strand in the rhetorical tradition itself, led by Aristotle, and arguably the dominant view, sees rhetorical argumentation as defined with reference to the domain of issues discussed. On that view, the domain of rhetorical argumentation is centered on choice of action in the civic sphere, and the distinctive nature of issues in this domain is considered crucial. Hence, argumentation theories such as those discussed, insofar as they do not see rhetoric as defined by its distinctive domain, apply an understanding of rhetoric that is historically inadequate. It is further suggested that theories adopting this understanding of rhetoric risk ignoring important distinctive features of argumentation about action.
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Notes
Undoubtedly, van Eemeren and Houtlosser would deny that there is such a dilemma. Indeed, some of their formulations of how debaters could be rhetorical and dialectical at the same time are such that rhetoricians ought to give them their wholehearted endorsement, for example when they speak of “maintaining certain standards of reasonableness and expecting others to comply with the same critical standards”, after which they go on to say that this commitment need not prevent debaters from “attempting to resolve the difference of opinion in their own favour” (2001, p. 151). This sounds like the position often articulated by the late Wayne Booth, and I agree with it completely. However, obeying standards of reasonableness is not the same as being committed to resolving the difference of opinion. It may be true that if debaters in politics and other spheres did obey such standards, they would reach consensus more often; but even with the severest standards upheld they often would not. Why? Some of the authentic debate examples that van Eemeren and Houtlosser have analyzed are actually about the kind of issues where consensus may never ensue, no matter how much reasonable discussion the discussants would have engaged in; this is also the kind of issue where rhetorical argumentation typically occurs. For instance, in the British debate about fox-hunting clearly no resolution of the difference occurs. Yet in most of the strategic manoeuvres on the two sides that van Eemeren and Houtlosser have discussed there is no unreasonableness, no “derailment” of strategic manoeuvring; but there is no consensus either. The pragma-dialectical theory, based on the ideal of the critical discussion and aiming at a resolution of the difference, predicts that if the rules are obeyed, consensus will occur. So why doesn’t it? My answer is that legislation on fox-hunting is a typical example of an issue belonging to the rhetorical domain of issues—those ultimately concerned with choice of action, not truth.
This division of labour was first suggested by Wenzel (1990).
Jeffrey Walker seems to make a strong case against such a claim. He sees rhetoric as rooted in the poetic/epideictic kind of discourse performed by “singers”, aiodoi, according to Hesiod (c. 700 B·C.); the “pragmatic discourse” of later age is, to Walker, a “’secondary’ projection of that rhetoric into the particular forums and dispute occasions of civic life” (2000, p. 10). I have no need to contradict Walker’s genealogy; as I noted initially, rhetoric is a wider concept than rhetorical argumentation. Yet it remains true that most ancient theorists of rhetorical argumentation from Aristotle onwards see it as rooted in civic issues. And in fact, there is a reason why poetic and epideictic features of the discourse of the aiodoi may be “projected” into the domain of civic debate. As will be discussed below, such debate is about choosing action, not about the truth of propositions. In debate about choice of action, two opposite standpoints may both be legitimate and reasonable; it is not the case that one is “true” while the other is “false”. Hence neither debater may be compelled by dialectical argument to retract his standpoint and agree with the other. Instead, debaters must seek to win the free adherence of their opponents and audience by including, among other arguments and appeals, features known poetic and epideictic discourse.
This follows Kennedy's translation (1991). The translation in the complete English edition of Aristotle's works, by J.H. Freese (Aristotle 1926), consistently uses "deliberate", as does Kennedy some of the time; it is a word which, like the Greek bouleuein, is tied more closely than "debate" to discussions of what we will.
Long notes that Aristotle uses the middle voice of bouleuein throughout the Ethics, giving the word the self-reflexive meaning “to take council with oneself”, and thereby underlining the importance of this self-reflexivity to his concept of phronêsis (2002, p. 52).
This example will probably raise objections to the effect that, as Alan Gross (1990), Jeanne Fahnestock (2003) and others have shown, argumentation in the natural sciences is full of rhetoric. However, while features of rhetorical argumentation may, unavoidably, show up even in domains like science, there remains a difference of principle between arguments over truth and arguments over action. To be sure, a scientist may have been influenced in part by the rhetoric of, e.g., Einstein’s writing, to opt for atomic theory in the sense that he chooses to believe in the existence of atoms and to propagate this belief in his teaching, etc.; but he may not decide to bring about the existence of atoms, any more than he may decide to bring about anything else in the fundamental constitution of nature. He may, however, as any other human being, decide to bring about any number of changes or events in his own life, e.g., to marry, to quit smoking, to eat a hamburger, to kill himself; or he may decide to help bring about events and changes in the social world he inhabits, e.g., by voting for a given presidential candidate. Similarly, he may argue for the truth of atomic theory, but not for atoms coming into existence; conversely, he may argue for the election of the candidate of his choice, but that argument is not an argument for the "truth" of that choice. Of course, an argument for someone's election may be (and usually is) supported by assertions whose truth the arguer argues for, e.g., that the candidate is well qualified, that his policies are wise, etc. But what we argue for in deliberation, such a the election of a given candidate, is not a proposition that may have a truth value; by contrast, what we argue for in science is precisely a proposition that may have a truth value, even though the philosophy of science tells us that we will never be able conclusively to determine that truth value.
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Kock, C. Choice is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical Argumentation. Argumentation 23, 61–80 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-008-9115-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-008-9115-x