Abstract
I examine social capital’s impact on financial reports. Based on the social capital literature, I predict that the quality of the financial reports is higher when a firm is headquartered in a region with high social capital. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the firms that are headquartered in this type of region in the USA have a lower probability of committing fraud by misrepresenting financial information. Further, I find that the firms in regions with high social capital have lower levels of discretionary accruals and much more readable annual reports.
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Notes
CSR is a measure of how socially responsible a firm is—it is not a measure of the intrinsic norms of the managers to behave honestly and the propensity to honor obligations—social capital measures these qualities. Also, higher CSR can sometimes be a cover for misbehavior (Hemingway and Maclagan 2004; Prior et al. 2008; Petrovits 2006).
These are some of the recent studies (e.g., Grullon et al. 2010; Hilary and Hui 2009; McGuire et al. 2012; Jha and Chen 2015; Jha and Cox 2015) that examine the role of either religiosity or social capital in financial decisions. In each of these studies the culture of where the firm is headquartered is used as measure for the culture of the managers. These studies provide detailed discussions on how the culture of the place of domicile and that of a firm’s manager are congruent. For brevity, I refer to these papers and do not present that argument in this paper.
I do not control for the literacy, income inequality, and racial diversity, because these variables are determinants of the SocialCapital. However, as robustness tests I verify that the results continue to hold even when I control for these three regional characteristics.
I check the inflation factor (VIF) for multicollinearity among the independent variables in each OLS test on the main hypotheses. The largest VIF, 3.96, is much <10. This VIF shows that multicollinearity is not a problem.
I also verify that the results are robust when standard errors are double clustered in the following ways: clustering by firm and county, firm and industry, firm and year, county and year, and county and industry.
The fact that the GAO, AA, SCAC, and the AAERs omit a large faction of events they purport to capture and double count some of them creates type 1 and type 2 errors—this problem might compromise the validity of any tests using these data sources to examine the propensity to commit fraud.
The data and descriptions on how social capital indexes are constructed are available at: http://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/community/tools/social-capital.
The results continue to hold if I remove religious organization.
The eigenvalues of the first components for these years are 1.80, 2.06, 1.94, and 1.80 respectively. The eigenvalues of the other components are less than one except in 2009 when the second component has an eigenvalue of 1.03.
The industries that I remove have the following Fama–French 48-digit Industry classifications: 3 (Soda: Candy and Beer), 5 (Smoke: Tobacco Products), 26 (Guns: Defense), and 29 (Coal).
Although untabulated, I also verify that the results continue to hold when I conduct a county-year regression. That is, I calculate the median of all variables at the county-year level and test if the results are robust.
In the main model, I do not control for ethnic diversity, literacy, and income inequality from the county where the firm is headquartered because these variables are highly correlated with social capital and are also its possible determinants. Whether these variables have a direct effect on financial reporting is also unclear, but quite likely they affect social capital, which in turn affects financial reporting. Therefore, the inclusion of these variables can likely take away from what might be the effect of social capital. Regardless, even when I control for these variables, I continue to find that, ceteris paribus, higher social capital has an association with better quality financial reports. However, as expected the significance levels are slightly lower. For brevity, I do not report these results.
Matching based on propensity scores constructed using these firm level variables produces a matched sample with the least bias—that is, the treated and the matched sample are the most alike. However, the results are robust when I construct propensity scores based on the control variable specified in Eq. 1.
These dates are available in the FSR database compiled by Karpoff et al. (2012).
In untabulated results, I also use a linear probability model (LPM) (i.e., an OLS) and verify that the results are similar—the p values are slightly lower but still significant at 10%.
Consider the following example: in the presence of a strict teacher all students are likely to behave. But in the absence of a strict teacher, naughty children are more likely to misbehave. Put differently, the effects of naughtiness (intrinsic nature) are more salient when the disciplinarian (external monitoring) is weak.
In untabulated results, I also use a linear probability model (LPM) (i.e., the OLS) and verify that the results are similar—the p values are slightly lower. The LPM avoids the pitfalls of the logit model when examining the difference in the coefficients across groups. For brevity, I do not report these results.
I also examine if the effect of social capital is stronger for firms that are further away from SEC. The idea is that the SEC’s enforcement might be weaker for firms headquartered further away from its office. To do so, I split the sample into two groups based on the median distance from the SEC. The results are qualitatively consistent with the idea that when external monitoring is weak, the effect of social capital is stronger. I find that the coefficient for social capital is negative and significant for firms that are further away, but nonsignificant for those close. However, there is no statistical difference. For brevity, I do not report the results.
I also find that qualitatively the effect of social capital is stronger for firms that have a higher g-index (i.e., those that are poorly monitored by their board of directors). I conduct this analysis by dividing the sample into two groups based on the median level of the g-index. I find that for the group with a high g-index the effect of social capital is large, negative, and significant but for those with a low value for the g-index, the coefficient is not significant. For brevity, I do not report the results.
The results are also similar when I split the sample based on the median level of analysts. For firms that have no analysts following, the effect of social capital on financial fraud is much stronger, as expected. It is nonsignificant for the group that has analysts following.
They conduct a similar analysis to examine if the social capital reduces the price of bank loan contracting for firms that move to a higher social capital region, compared to those that do not.
I use the absolute value of the discretionary accruals rather than the signed value because the managers have an incentive to manage earnings upwards as well as downwards. However, in unreported tests I verify that the coefficient for SocialCapital is also significant when I use the signed value of the discretionary accruals.
The results are similar when I use the performance adjusted discretionary accruals as suggested in Kothari et al. (2005).
Jha and Chen (2015) conduct a similar exercise with audit fees and find that in a multivariate framework, the effect of social capital hardly changes when religiosity is removed as one of the control variables in a regression where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the audit fees.
Column 1 presents the coefficients when both SocialCapital and Religiosity are included (it is the same as Column 1 of Panel C in Table 1). I present it here again to make it easier to compare.
Neither a likelihood ratio test as in Allison (1999) nor a test using an interaction term for a dummy of the high social capital and religiosity in a LPM shows that the difference is statistically significant.
The control variables include SocialCapital. But the results are similar if I exclude SocialCapital.
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Acknowledgements
I thank Steven Dellaportas (editor) and two anonymous referees for their valuable feedback. I thank the authors who have been kind enough to share their hand-collected data: Jonathan Karpoff, Allison Koeste, Scott Lee, and Gerald Martin for sending me their financial misconduct data; and Feng Li and Bill McDonald for sharing their data on the readability of annual reports on their Web site. I thank Yu Chen, Siddharth Shankar, George Clarke, and Christopher Boudreaux for their valuable feedback. I also thank Jonathan Moore for copyediting my manuscript.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Dependent variables | |
FinclFraud | This is an indicator variable that equals one if it is included in the FSR database compiled by Karpoff et al. (2012). To be included in this database, the firm needs to be guilty of financial fraud. Source: Karpoff et al. (2012) |
|DiscAccrual| | This variable is the absolute value of the discretionary accruals calculated by using the modified Jones (1991) model. To calculate the discretionary accruals, I first calculate the total accruals (ibc − (oancf − xidoc)) by using the cash flow approach as suggested by Hribar and Collins (2002). To remove the effect of the outliers, I remove the observations where the ratio of the total accruals to the assets is more than two standard deviations away. Following the steps of the modified Jones (1991) model, I use this regression for each industry year: \(\frac{{TA_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} = \beta_{0} \frac{1}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{1} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{2} \frac{{PPE_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \varepsilon_{it}\) |
The industry classification is based on the two-digit SIC code, and I require that there are at least 15 observations in each industry year. I also require that the firms be headquartered in the USA. The TA is the total accruals; Assets is the total assets (at); Sales is the total sales (sale); and the PPE is the gross plant, property, and equipment (ppegt). In the second step, I use the coefficient for the regression in the first step to calculate the discretionary accruals as follows: \(\begin{aligned} & NDA_{it} = \left( {\hat{\beta }_{0} \frac{1}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \hat{\beta }_{1} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{it} - \Delta Receivables_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \hat{\beta }_{2} \frac{{PPE_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }}} \right) \\ & DISC\_ACC_{it} = \frac{{TA_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} - NDA_{it} \\ \end{aligned}\)where the Receivables are the total receivables (rect). Source: COMPUSTAT | |
DechowDichevAQ | This variable is calculated following Francis et al. (2005). As in their study, I first calculate the residuals from the following regression for each industry year |
\(\begin{aligned} TCA_{it} & = \hat{\beta }_{0} + \hat{\beta }_{1} \frac{{CFO_{it - 1} }}{{Assets_{it - 2} }} + \hat{\beta }_{2} \frac{{CFO_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \hat{\beta }_{3} \frac{{CFO_{it + 1} }}{{Assets_{it} }} \\ &\quad + \hat{\beta }_{4} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \hat{\beta }_{4} \frac{{PPE_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \varepsilon_{it} . \\ \end{aligned}\) | |
The TCA is the total accruals calculated as follows: ((act-L.act) − (lct-L.lct) − (che-L.che) + (dlc-L.dlc))/(L.at)). The CFO is calculated as follows: (ibc-TA), where TA is calculated as ((act-L.act) − (lct-L.lct) − (che-L.che) + (dlc-L.dlc) − (dp)). The Sales is the total sales (sale); the PPE is the gross plant, property, and equipment (ppegt); and the Assets is the total assets (at). Before running this regression and to remove the effect of the outliers, I remove the observations where the ratio of the total accruals to the assets is more than two standard deviations away. The industry classification is based on the two-digit SIC code, and I require that there be at least 15 observations in each industry-year. I also require that the firms be headquartered in the USA | |
I then calculate the standard deviations in the residuals of the current year and the past 4 years. If this cannot be calculated due to missing values, then I replace the missing values with the standard deviations of the residuals of the current year and the past 3 years. Higher values represent higher accruals management. Source: COMPUSTAT | |
RealErngMgmt1 | Following the literature (Cohen and Zarowin 2010), this variable is the sum of the abnormal discretionary expense (AB_DISEXP) and the abnormal level of production (AB_PROD). It is constructed so that the higher values represent greater real earnings management. The industry classification is based on the two-digit SIC code, and I require that there be at least 15 observations in each industry year. I also require that the firms be headquartered in the USA |
The AB_DISEXP is the residual (actual-predicted) of the following regression: \(\frac{{DIS\_EXP_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} = \beta_{0} \frac{1}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{1} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \varepsilon_{it} ,\) where DIS_EXP is the total discretionary expenses (xsga + xad + xrd). Consistent with the research (Cohen et al. 2008), the advertising (xad) and the R&D expense (xrd) are set to zero if the SG&A expense (xsga) is available. The Assets variable is the total assets (at), and the Sales is the total sales (sales). To remove the effect of the outliers, I remove the observations where the ratio of the discretionary expense to the assets is more than two standard deviations away. Following their studies, I standardize the residuals | |
The AB_PROD is the standardized value of the abnormal level of production. I first estimate the residuals (actual-predicted) of the following regression: \(\frac{{PROD_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} = \beta_{0} \frac{1}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{1} \frac{{Sales_{it - 1} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{2} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{3} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{it - 1} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \varepsilon_{it}\)where the PROD is the sum of the costs of the goods sold and the change in inventory (cogs + (invt − L.invt)), Assets is the total assets (at), and the Sales is the total sales (sales). To remove the effect of the outliers, I remove the observations where the ratio of the PROD to the assets is more than two standard deviations away. The residual is multiplied by −1 so that the higher values represent higher earnings management. I then standardize it. Source: COMPUSTAT | |
RealErngMgmt2 | This variable is the sum of the abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_DISEXP) and the abnormal level of cash flows (AB_CASH). The higher values represent greater real earnings management calculated as in Cohen and Zarowin (2010). The industry classification is based on the two-digit SIC code, and I require that there be at least 15 observations in each industry year. I also require that the firms be headquartered in the USA |
The AB_DISEXP is calculated as described above. The AB_CASH is the residual (actual-predicted) of the following regression: \(\frac{{CFO_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} = \beta_{0} \frac{1}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{2} \frac{{Sales_{it - 1} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{3} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{it} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \beta_{4} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{it - 1} }}{{Assets_{it - 1} }} + \varepsilon_{it}\)where the CFO is the cash flow from operations (oancf-xidoc), Assets is the total assets (at), and the Sales is the total sales (sales). To remove the effect of the outliers, I remove the observations where the ratio of the CFO to the assets is more than two standard deviations away. The residual is multiplied by −1 so that the higher values represent higher earnings management. I then standardize the residuals. Source: COMPUSTAT | |
FogIndex | This variable measures the readability of the annual reports as in Li (2008). It is constructed by Feng Li and available on his website. Source: http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/ |
NumberOfWords | This variable measures the number of words in the annual report. It is constructed by Feng Li and available on his Web site. Source: http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/ |
ln(SizeMegabytes) | The data is obtained from Bill McDonald’s Web site. Source: http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html |
Main variable of interest | |
SocialCapital | This measures the social capital at the county level and is constructed as in Rupasingha et al. (2008). Source: Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NERCRD), Rupasingha et al. (2008) |
Demographic controls | |
Rrural | This is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm is in a county that does not fall under the 100 most populated and zero otherwise. Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA). CBSA is a US geographic area defined by the Office of Management and Budget that consists of one or more counties (or equivalents) anchored by an urban center of at least 10,000 people. Source: Census Bureau |
Religiosity | This variable is the percentage of religious adherents in the county. Source: Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA) |
ln(Population) | This variable is the natural log of the county’s population. Source: Census |
IncomePerCapita | This variable is the income per capita in the county. Source: BEA |
ln(DistancefromSEC) | This variable is the natural log of one plus the distance to the closest SEC branch. As in Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), the SEC branches considered are the SEC headquarters in Washington D.C and the regional offices located in New York City, NY; Miami, FL; Chicago, IL; Denver, CO; and Los Angeles, CA. As in their studies, the Haversine formula that uses the longitude and latitude of the two points is used to calculate the distance. Source: BEA |
PopulationDensity | This variable is the population of the county divided by the land area of the county. Source: Census Bureau |
Firm-level controls | |
ln(MarketValue) | This variable is the market value of equity calculated by multiplying the stock’s closing price in the calendar year and the number of common shares outstanding (prcc_c * csho). Source: COMPUSTAT |
Analysts | This variable is the number of analysts for the latest consensus forecast (numest). If this number is not available for a firm, then the number of analysts following is assumed to be zero. Source: I/B/E/S unadjusted summary file. |
ReturnOnAssets | This variable is the ratio of earnings before the interest tax depreciation and amortization to the total assets. Source: COMPUSTAT |
DebtToAssets | This variable is the ratio of the total debt to the total assets (lt/at). Source: COMPUSTAT |
Big4 | This variable is a binary variable that equals one if the auditor is one of the Big4 and zero otherwise. Sources: COMPUSTAT |
MarketToBook | This variable is the market-to-book value of the firm. It is the ratio of the common equity to the market value (ceq/(prcc_c * csho)). Source: COMPUSTAT |
Loss | This is an indicator variable that equals one if the income before the extraordinary items (ibc) is less than zero for the current year or the last 2 years. Source: COMPUSTAT |
VolatilityOfCashflow | This variable measures the volatility of the cash flows to the total assets (oancf/at) for the current year and the last 4 years. If the lag values for all 4 years are unavailable, I construct the volatility measure using the current year and the last 3 years. Source: COMPUSTAT |
Benchmark | This variable is a binary variable that equals one if (1) the net income to the lag of assets (ni/at) is greater than or equal to zero but is <0.01 or (2) the change in the net income divided by the assets from the previous year is greater than or equal to zero but <0.01, and zero otherwise. Source: COMPUSTAT |
ln(AuditorTenure) | This variable is the natural log of one plus the number of years the auditor has been with the firm. Sources: COMPUSTAT |
ChangeInGDP | This variable is the percentage growth rate of the real GDP compared to the previous year. Source: BEA |
Investment | This variable is the ratio of the capital expenditure in year t to the net property, plant, and equipment at the end of year t − 1 (capxv/L.ppent). Source: COMPUSTAT |
NetOperatingAssets | This variable is the net operating assets. It is the sum of the stockholder’s equity less marketable securities and the total debt that is scaled by the total assets ((seq − che + lt)/at). Source: COMPUSTAT |
ln(NumberOfSubs) | This variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of the subsidiaries. Source: COMPUSTAT |
CEOReplaced | This is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is replaced in the following 2 years after the firm’s possible fraud was first revealed to the public. Source: Execucomp |
FraudTriggerYear | This is an indicator variable that equals one for the firm year in which investors were told of possible fraud in the firm. Source: Execucomp |
Post | Post is an indicator variable that equals one for the firm years after the firm relocates and zero otherwise. Source: Karpoff et al. (2012) |
SocialCapital_Increasing_Move | This variable equals one for the firm year after the firm moved to a county with higher social capital, and zero otherwise. Source: Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NERCRD), Rupasingha et al. (2008). |
SocialCapital(NoElection) | This variable measures the social capital without the influence of political activism. It is calculated in the same way as the SocialCapital except that one of the norm variables (the votes cast in the presidential elections divided by the population above 18) is omitted. Source: NERCRD |
Electoral participation | This variable measures participation in a presidential election |
Census response rate | This variable measures the percentage of people that return filled-out census forms |
# of NGOs | This variable measures the number of non-government organizations normalized by the population in the county |
# of associations | This variable measures the number of associations normalized by the population |
Norm | This is the first component of a principal component analysis that uses Electoral participation and Census response rate |
Network | This is the first component of a principal component analysis that uses # of NGOs and # of Associations |
Industry dummies | This variable is a set of binary variables constructed based on the Fama–French 48-industry grouping. Source: COMPUSTAT |
Appendix 2: Additional Tests
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
---|---|---|---|
DV = FinclFraud | |||
Panel A: The norms appear to have a stronger impact than the network | |||
Norms | −0.221*** | −0.211*** | |
(0.002) | (0.003) | ||
Network | −0.157 | −0.090 | |
(0.216) | (0.453) | ||
Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
County-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 85,743 | 85,743 | 85,743 |
(Pseudo) R2 | 0.076 | 0.074 | 0.076 |
Prob > χ2 | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
DV = FinclFraud | ||||
Panel B: The common component of the four measures of social capital has a stronger effect on financial fraud | ||||
Electoral participation | −2.050*** | |||
(0.004) | ||||
Census response rate | −1.448 | |||
(0.151) | ||||
# of NGOs | −0.007 | |||
(0.136) | ||||
# of associations | −0.424 | |||
(0.127) | ||||
Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
County-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 85,743 | 85,743 | 85,743 | 85,743 |
(Pseudo) R2 | 0.0750 | 0.0741 | 0.742 | 0.741 |
Prob > χ2 | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
DV = FinclFraud | |||||
year ≤ 2002 | year > 2002 | ||||
Panel C: State-fixed effects | |||||
SocialCapital | −0.175 | −0.173* | −0.177* | −0.093 | −0.623** |
(0.209) | (0.079) | (0.069) | (0.567) | (0.028) | |
State-fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
County-level controls | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Industry dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 84,896 | 84,896 | 84,896 | 51,982 | 25,996 |
(Pseudo) R2 | 0.0826 | 0.0812 | 0.0766 | 0.0841 | 0.0979 |
Prob > χ2 | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
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Jha, A. Financial Reports and Social Capital. J Bus Ethics 155, 567–596 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3495-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3495-5
Keywords
- Financial fraud
- Social capital
- Financial report
- Discretionary accruals
- Real earnings management
- Fog index