Abstract
Airborne illicit arms traffickers from the former Soviet space are resourceful and adaptable international criminals who have built complex air trafficking networks by successfully cultivating strategic connections in a number of geographically distant states. This paper examines the airborne arms trafficking operations of networks from former Soviet states which transfer weapons and ammunition to areas of conflict in Africa, embargoed African states, or those descending into conflict. As such, these arms traffickers brazenly circumvent international regulations by obscuring their air cargo operations and securing impunity through subornation, fraud, and exploitation of lax regulations. Importantly, they rely on strategic connections in former Soviet states for a steady supply of arms, on states such as UAE for relaxed oversight and free trade zones for transit, product warehousing, and laundering of proceeds, and on carefully-cultivated connections with “big men” and/or local fixers in African states for speedy delivery and payment.
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Notes
Not all illicit trade occurs under conflict conditions in which the ruling polity is challenged or weakened. In the cases of Taylor’s Liberia, Gaddafi’s Libya, present-day Iran, Syria, and Venezuela, to name a few, reports suggest that the ruling party itself is engaged as purchaser, supplier, and/or transshipment point of illegally-traded goods.
None of the non-Baltic states of the former Soviet Union has traditionally fared well on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). For the 2012 CPI, which ranks the perceived level of corruption using an array of data in 176 countries, the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan tied with a ranking of 133, Kyrgyzstan ranked 154th, Tajikistan ranked 157th, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan tied with a ranking of 170.
With the exception of seven countries on the continent, all African countries ranked by Transparency International for its 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scored under 40 on the CPI scale of 0–100, with 0 being entirely corrupt and 100 being entirely devoid of corruption. Two African countries were unranked.
Although the intent of this paper is to consider African states as part of the delivery environment, it is worth noting that because illicit arms trade networks are adapting to the circumstances of a changed global political climate and a saturated African weapons market, increasingly they are using relatively stable African countries as transshipment points.
Trast Aero’s old website linked to its new website provides an active link as of May 2013, also lists affiliate offices in Brazzaville, Congo, and Djibouti as well as several states in South America (Bogotá, Colombia; Lima, Peru; and Caracas, Venezuela), the Middle East (headquarters in Sharjah and affiliate in Amman, Jordan), and the former Soviet Union (Rostov-on-Don, Russia: Kharkov and Kyiv, Ukraine; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Kazakhstan; and Moldova).
Côte d’Ivoire has been under UN embargo since 2004.
Research also found that managers and leaders of illicit arms networks from the former Soviet space have what can be called a “pan-Soviet upbringing,” or living and professional experience in several Soviet states. This fact is significant, in that even internal migration and mobility within the Soviet Union was minimal; only those with authorization to move for official (professional) reasons to a new city or region would obtain a propiska (residency permit) from the new jurisdiction’s authorities. Hiring or paying a worker who did not bear the appropriate propiska was illegal. Generally, only military personnel, scientists, and other specialized professionals would have cause for professional migration within the Soviet Union or—even less so—abroad. This indicates the likely former professions of the illicit networks’ leaders and/or their parents.
For example, Viktor Bout was paid by the US Government to run flights in support of the US war in Iraq.
For a list of these and other information about FTZs in the UAE, see the National Media Council of the United Arab Emirates webpage: http://www.uaeinteract.com/business/freezones.asp.
In a review of the role played by FTZs in the transit, production, and promulgation of counterfeit goods, the International Trademark Association describes an FTZ as “a specified area within the territorial jurisdiction of a country where there is either a minimum or no customs control on entry or exit of goods. FTZ’s…are not subject to such standard government restrictions on trade as Customs treatment, banking laws, taxation, labour (sic) laws and economical laws and transactions… Goods passing through FTZ’s or FP’s and transshipped through multiple ports, creates opportunities for counterfeiters to disguise the true country of origin of goods.” (International Trademark Association 2013)
For more information see, Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, http://www.dmcc.ae/.
Part of the Stability Pact, and a partner with the United Nations Development Programme, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) is the executive arm of the Regional Implementation Plan on Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).
This information is based on research from 2009 until the present.
Research uncovered high-quality housing in Somaliland that appeared to be used regularly by one network.
These three companies are identified as Bout-owned in the 16 December 2009 United Nations document “The Assets Freeze List”, available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1521/1532_afl.htm.
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Thachuk, K., Saunders, K. Under the Radar: Airborne Arms Trafficking Operations in Africa. Eur J Crim Policy Res 20, 361–378 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-014-9247-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-014-9247-5